



JPRS-EER-91-120  
12 AUGUST 1991



# ***JPRS Report***



## **East Europe**

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# East Europe

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## CONTENTS

12 August 1991

### BULGARIA

SDS in Pirin Macedonia on Constitution, VMRO [DEMOKRATSIYA 16 Jul]	1
Criticism of BSDP Personalities Rebutted	2
Dertliev, Kornazhev Attacked [DEMOKRATSIYA 12 Jul]	2
Dertliev's Response [SVOBODEN NAROD 16 Jul]	5

### CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Federal Referendum Bill Approved	7
What It Says [LIDOVE NOVINY 19 Jul]	7
How Deputies Voted [MLADA FRONTA DNES 19 Jul]	7
Czech Editorial Comment [LIDOVE NOVINY 20 Jul]	7
Federal Minister on New Slovak Ministry [SMENA 16 Jul]	7
Common Czech-Slovak State Justified [KULTURNY ZIVOT 9 Jul]	9
Slovak Daily Describes Voting on Referendum	9
Objections of Slovak Deputies [SMENA 18 Jul]	9
Most KDH Deputies Abstain [SMENA 19 Jul]	10
Leader Discusses Concept of Conservatism [REPORTER 11-17 Jul]	10
Official Alleges Disagreement Within KDH [PRACA 18 Jul]	11
ODS Deputy Chairman Describes Party Views [OBCANSKY DENIK 17 Jul]	13
Slusovice Scandal Said To Involve StB [LIDOVE NOVINY 20 Jul]	16
2 Central Banks Would Produce 2 Currencies [VEREJNOST 12 Jul]	16

### HUNGARY

Torgyan Blasts Government's Economic Policy [MAGYAR HIRLAP 29 Jul]	18
Pozsgay's Plans: 'We Think in Longer Term' [NEPSZABADSAG 29 Jul]	18
Political Struggle Over School Principal [MAGYAR HIRLAP 29 Jul]	19
Election Laws, House Rules Discussed, Debated [MAGYAR HIRLAP 29 Jul]	20
Rumors, Controversy Surround Radio Free Europe [NEPSZABADSAG 29 Jul]	21
Soviet Account Settlement Plan Incomprehensible [MAGYAR HIRLAP 18 Jul]	21
Finance Minister Kupa on Various Issues [MAGYAR HIRLAP 11 Jul]	22
Finance Ministry Official on 1992 Budget [MAGYAR HIRLAP 12 Jul]	23
AVU Role in YBL Bank Stock Sale Explained [MAGYAR HIRLAP 11 Jul]	24
Wisdom of Nuclear Energy Reliance Disputed [NEPSZABADSAG 17 Jul]	25
Bankrupt Enterprises, Proceedings Analyzed [MAGYAR HIRLAP 18 Jul]	26

### POLAND

Democratic Union's Draft Antiabortion Law Examined [GAZETA WYBORCZA 16 Jul]	28
Recent Poll Reveals Apathetic Electorate [RZECZPOSPOLITA 22 Jul]	28

### ROMANIA

ROMANIA MARE Attitudes Deplored [ROMANIA LITERARA 25 Jul]	30
Manolescu Reviews Book on King Michael [ROMANIA LITERARA 25 Jul]	31
Manolescu Analyzes Privatization Law Debate [ROMANIA LITERARA 25 Jul]	33

### YUGOSLAVIA

Leader of Serbian National Renewal Interviewed [OTADZBINA 21 Jun]	36
Demographer on Resolving Croatia's Ethnic Problem [GLOBUS 26 Jul]	38
Bosnian Leader on Muslim-Croat Relations Crisis [DANAS 30 Jul]	41
Historic Agreement Between Muslims, Serbs [BORBA 2 Aug]	43

### SDS in Pirin Macedonia on Constitution, VMRO

91BA0930A Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian  
16 Jul 91 p 3

[Article by Senior Assistant Lyudmil Georgiev, candidate of economic sciences and chairman of the regional electoral club of the Union of Democratic Forces: "Unrehearsed Game of Political Ignorance, or How a Repetition of Historical Errors Becomes Possible"]

[Text] As we know, not one of the eight elected deputies in Pirin Macedonia—seven from the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] and one from the DPS [Movement for Rights and Freedoms]—signed the Constitution on 12 July 1991. Added to them were the leaders on the SDS and the DPS tickets. Therefore, the number of people's representatives in the area who did not sign was 10 out of a total of 16. Two of the remaining six are on the SDS ticket; these gentlemen, who entered the VNS [Grand National Assembly] through the backdoor, represent no one but themselves. For quite some time, both the SDS in Pirin Macedonia and their own organizations have withdrawn their political trust in them because they are unknown to the voters and have done nothing to express the will of the voters.

The other four—three from the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] and one from the BZNS [Bulgarian National Agrarian Union]—were elected on the basis of the proportional representation system, which makes their signing the Constitution as representatives of Pirin Macedonia quite questionable and quite fictitious. Furthermore, the absence of all of the people's representatives elected by a majority vote, who expressed not only their personal wishes but also those of their electorate, makes the conclusion indicated in the Declaration of the Regional Alliance of Democratic Forces, which was issued on the same day, 12 July, the only accurate one: Pirin Macedonia will not accept the adopted Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria until a nationwide referendum has been held.

The fact that an entire area of the country will not accept the Constitution without a referendum appears to sufficiently worry the parliament, the Presidency, and the government—in this case, however, it is not just any part of the country but precisely Pirin Macedonia, that part of Bulgaria that has suffered the most, that has been most suppressed and most neglected.

If we accept the fact that the first significant act of neglect of the Bulgarians in Macedonia by our rulers was the 27 April 1888 convention about the Tsaribrod-Vakarel railroad track, which linked the Sofia-Kyustendil-Skopje railroad, we can draw a huge list of smaller or bigger errors, the psychological legacy and consequences of which may be seen to this day. These trends intensified with the creation of the VMRO [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization] because the population of "old Bulgaria" was unable to understand the difficulties the Macedonian Bulgarians had to surmount in their struggle to become part of the

homeland and achieve freedom and democracy. It was thus that, historically, paradoxical psychological interrelationships developed, the ignorance of which can only confirm the low political standards—on the one hand, the fear shown by the political rulers concerning the age-old aspirations of Macedonian Bulgarians, "crowned" by the communist repressions after 9 September 1944, and, on the other, the mistrust with which the political actions of Macedonian Bulgarians were received by the remaining population. The most dangerous consequence of this paradox is the developing and perhaps subconscious attitude on the part of the Macedonian Bulgarians toward the homeland as a careless mother who has abandoned her own child. And, if to this day we can note in domestic policies manifestations of such psychological relations, particularly taking as an example the Constitution, voted-for but unsigned by the deputies from Pirin Macedonia, the continuing errors could take an undesirable aspect, bearing in mind the current political situation in the Balkans.

It may do us some good to recall that, with the creation and, particularly, Vanche Mikhaylov's proclamation that the VMRO was a supraparty national organization, it became a historical guarantor of the historical interests of Macedonian Bulgarians. Political parties and their petty struggles and quarrels do not have deep roots in the social life of the area, and it is no accident that the Macedonian deputies in the Bulgarian parliament have always maintained strong ties to the VMRO. If we ignore the 45-year communist stagnation in our sociopolitical life, we can see that, since the end of 1989, the functions of the VMRO as an above-party structure but one of leading political significance have begun to be taken over by the SDS. Its features, especially as a national movement, are most clearly expressed in Pirin Macedonia. This had results not only in last year's elections but also in the political activities of the people's representatives. The fact that, in addition to a tremendous amount of work concerning the future of the area, they also laid the foundations for the activities of the group of 39 and of the hunger strikers speaks for itself. That is precisely why, in the days to come, the fact that it was none other than Macedonian deputies who were beaten up in the center of Sofia on 12 July 1991, the day the Constitution was signed, will not be forgotten, although this act could be given all sorts of interpretations by the political circles in the country. It is clear that there are historical traditions, revived after the collapse of the communist regime, that should not be forgotten and that will be difficult to eliminate. It is only by taking such traditions into consideration that the political farsightedness of our contemporary rulers can be proved.

Naturally, the state institutions may ignore the demand of the Regional Alliance of Democratic Forces-Pirin Macedonia to hold a referendum and rescind the requirement to take a second oath, something that would deprive Pirin Macedonia of its people's representatives. Initially, this would bring about, again by force, the recall of the hunger-striking deputies because the Macedonian Bulgarians cannot afford the luxury of allowing

them to endanger their health even more. The return of the people's representatives will mark the beginning of the reinterpretation of future political activities and of their scale under an eventual new but nonetheless still-communist Constitution and the possible absence of deputies from Pirin Macedonia in the transformed Ordinary National Assembly. The solution to such a political situation, which will be sought by the Regional Association of Democratic Forces-Pirin Macedonia, will probably not help to lower the social stress in the country because the alternatives suggested by the state institutions are very few.

Next week will be a serious test of the political farsightedness of the parliament, which must make decisions of vital importance to the entire sociopolitical, economic, and spiritual life in Pirin Macedonia, related to the demands included in the Declaration of the Regional Union of Democratic Forces of 12 July 1991. It is only their positive resolution that can stabilize the situation in Pirin Macedonia. This will also greatly determine the stability of the homeland, which must finally accept its own child, without repeating its historical errors.

### Criticism of BSDP Personalities Rebutted

#### Dertliev, Kornazhev Attacked

91BA0921A Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian  
12 Jul 91 p 4

[Article by Ivan Lilov: "When the Spots Increase on the Face of the Sun; Attempt at a Political Portrait of Petur Dertliev and Petur Kornazhev"; reprint of a DEBATI article]

[Text] It is objectively—this is no joke—and "with God's help," as the saying goes, that I am painting this combined portrait of the noted Dertliev-Kornazhev political couple, a couple that showed up on our political Olympus as of April 1990 and that to this day consciously or subconsciously has been throwing thunder, lightning, fireworks, and hot rocks from that peak.

The shining figure of Petur Dertliev appeared after 10 November 1989:

1. Seventy-three years old.
2. Straight posture, healthy, energetic.
3. An intelligent-looking face, implying nobility.

Add the following:

4. Higher medical training.
5. A good general culture.
6. Married, two daughters.
7. Opposition deputy and the only living member of the parliamentary opposition group (15 December 1945-6 November 1946).
8. Chairman of the Union of Social Democratic Youth.
9. Spent 10 years in prisons and camps.
10. The only intellectual link between the assassinated political leaders and the newly appeared political leaders.

11. An anti-ideological profession (physician) that offers the opportunity to earn a living and preserve one's honor and dignity in a regime whose objective was the national and moral degradation of every individual.

12. Interested and active in politics for 50 years, with politics in his blood.

13. A very good speaker.

14. A descendant of migrants from Veles who remembers those who live outside the borders of the free part of the homeland.

15. A good family and an intelligent wife, who bore with dignity the heavy cross of wife of a political prisoner.

16. Unquestionably, the only one who could be elected by a tremendous majority to be chairman of a modern Social Democratic Party.

17. A politician who can lead the nation and the state.

With such data, nothing remains other than to humbly thank God that such a noted political personality was saved from a destructive 45-year maelstrom. Thank God a politician appeared who could say—and, most important, be believed—"Since childhood and to this day, I have had endless dreams: to become a daring fighter for democracy and to shed my blood for democracy and for my people; to become a thunderous tribune and, with a powerful gift of speech, to accelerate the well-being and cultural upsurge; to become a ruler and, with you, establish a lasting order in society so that our actions will shine in the folk chronicles." Indeed, there are few politicians who had such tremendous opportunities. All of us witnessed, in July 1990 in the election of a president of the Republic, the way his candidacy was the bright hope of the majority.

The way solar spots cannot prevent solar radiation, the few Dertliev spots cannot obscure the Dertliev sun. Therefore, it was entirely proper for them to be totally ignored.

1. The first spot is dated January 1990, when he was interviewed on television as he was taking a walk in the Western Park. He said that he favored democratic socialism.

2. In February 1990, the group headed by Yanko Yankov, then deputy chairman of the BSDP [Bulgarian Social Democratic Party], "rebelled," demanding to publish economic articles in the newspaper SVOBODEN NAROD. Few members of the group believed the diagnosis made by Yanko Yankov and Boyko Proychev—namely, that Dertliev is a Marxist. Instead of insisting on a free debate on economic problems in the party organ and in that way solve the problem, several members of the group decided on their own to form an anti-Marxist party. This mistake was used by Dertliev, the experienced politician, to create the impression that Yanko Yankov's "rebellion" was the product of malice, careerism, and coarse fuhrerism. It is thus that the creators of the anti-Marxist party were isolated and thrown from the political train. The experienced politician brilliantly pursued his operation with the apparat by publishing

50-60 days later an equivocal small announcement in the newspaper SVOBODEN NAROD saying that there was no economic Marxism within the Social Democratic Party. The halfway nature of this communication was explained with tactical considerations: not to make any noise and ascribe some importance to the careerists who had been thrown from the train, and the claim that those same people had been fighting a ghost their ambition had deliberately created because, to begin with, there was no such thing as economic Marxism. Actually, this confused announcement and the explanation provided were a smokescreen for the Marxist Dertliev, with which he misled everyone (except for the few members of the Yankov group). This occasion and the Pushkarov case confirm what a brilliant apparat player Dertliev can be.

3. In March 1990, RABOTNICHESKO DELO published the text of a telegram sent by Dertliev to Stalin, dated November 1944, on the occasion of the Great October Revolution.

How strongly I wish that no more spots could be found so that the Dertliev sun—the hope of the nation—could go on shining. But such is not the case. One after another, huge, black, stinking, viscous, ineradicable spots sickly cover the entire solar discus, and a terrible darkness follows. Here they are:

4. By the end of November 1990, fearing that he would be left holding the bag alone, Rusi Khristozov began to talk somewhat more frankly and for that was locked up for about five days and made to realize that it was in his interest to keep quiet. When he came to his senses, he was released. However, during the time before his detention, he reported openly, in a press interview, that Dertliev had been informing State Security on the anti-communist activities of BSDP leader Krust'o Pas-tukhov. It is possible that one who would send such a telegram as he did to Stalin would consider such activities necessary to the performance of his duties. Faced with this terrible accusation, Mr. Dertliev did not take Rusi Khristozov to court for slander, nor did he refute his accusations. It was only after Rusi Khristozov died, in April 1991, that Dertliev interrupted his several-month-long silence on these matters, knowing that the dead man could not defend himself, and publicly refuted, via the press, Rusi Khristozov's accusations.

5. Motivated by intellectual honesty, Ivan Pushkarov cleansed himself of Marxist economic accretions and, toward the middle of December 1990, set up a group whose demands were quite similar to those of Yanko Yankov's group. The group held a conference in Hall No. 11 of the NDK [National Palace of Culture]. Dertliev's reaction to this was to expel Ivan Pushkarov and Ganka Kol'ovska, the two unrepentant members of the Executive Council of the SDP [Social Democratic Party], and to reprimand Prof. Aleksandur Cherkov and Teodora Moskova, the repenting members of the Executive Council. Of all these events, the only thing Dertliev reported on television concerned Pushkarov. Demonstrating unworthy verbal juggling, Dertliev described

Pushkarov's expulsion as "temporary removal from the party while he serves as a minister." Actually, there was no removal or temporary removal, and, furthermore, there is no such statute governing party membership because it makes no sense. What does exist is expulsion, and the reason for this was the creation of an anti-Marxist economic group. Several days later, in two separate issues of SVOBODEN NAROD, it was explained that the reason Pushkarov and Kol'ovska had been expelled was that they had formed that group. Furthermore, equally dishonorable was the duplicity: forming a cabinet and supporting it actively with the votes of the entire parliamentary group throughout its entire life, while, at the same time, removing Pushkarov from the party for being a minister in that same cabinet. It is thus that, through verbal juggling and a confused lack of clarification of the events, the Pushkarov-Kol'ovska "rebellion" was suppressed and the Marxist essence preserved. With the "Pushkarov-Kol'ovska" case, Dertliev demonstrated his apparat virtuosity and Marxism, his unworthy verbal juggling, and his dishonorable duplicity.

6. After he lost the elections, Dertliev stated in the press and in the parliament that this was a Pyrrhic victory for the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party], a victory that in a few months would turn into a terrible defeat. This was exactly what happened.

All of us remembered the electoral wish expressed by the BSP—"45 percent is enough." However, forgeries exceeded the limit, and the trouble came—53 percent. What to do now, when one is by nature against the government? Start governing, holding a red-hot coal in your pocket and one in your hands? Impeccably maneuvering strategically and tactically, the BSP was able to form a coalition cabinet that, in addition to all else, proved to be incompetent. The BSP was particularly interested in having an incompetent government in order to discredit the market economy and be able to implement the "human" Marxist economic theory that, this time, was supposed to yield good results because it would not be applied with a poor pair of hands. Furthermore, in this way the coalition government was able to whitewash the BSP. The splendid "coalition" maneuver turned the forthcoming defeat into a great victory, into a brilliant Cana [first miracle of Jesus Christ].

The main architects of the coalition government were Zhelev, Dertliev (assisted by Kornazhev), and Ludzhev. Dertliev performed as a superb shuttle, for which reason he was awarded the honor of being the godfather of the government, which he described as a "government of hope."

I do not know whether Zhelev and Ludzhev were aware of the existence of a Pyrrhic victory situation (they probably were); however, it was clearly recorded and proved in the press and in the parliament that Dertliev was aware of it because it was he, personally, who had announced its existence. How could it be that a brilliant, intelligent, and experienced politician allowed the



enemy to pull itself out of a Pyrrhic situation, participate personally in its elimination, and help bring about the Cana victory? Why did he not counteract by depriving the enemy of the fruits of his victory?

7. A political agreement on the holding of parliamentary elections in the month of May was concluded on 3 January 1991. In March 1991, Dertliev and his parliamentary group forgot to raise this question, for which reason elections could not be held in May.

8. Dertliev knew that the decisions and the actions of the Central Committee Politburo of 1944-56 to declare that the population south of Radomir belonged to a foreign nation, and to transfer that territory to Yugoslavia, meant committing the crime of treason according to the present Penal Code, and that such a crime was not subject to the statute of limitations. He knew that the decisions and the actions of the Politburo and the Central Committee of 1963 and 1973 on the destruction of our state were a further perpetration of the crime we mentioned.

Dertliev did not raise these two questions because, with maximal success, the following would have occurred:

1. About 200 former and present officials of the BSP would have been tried in court for treason against the homeland; and

2. The BSP would have been totally discredited as being an antinational party that committed treason against the people and the homeland unique in world history. The minimal result of raising these two problems would have been total discreditation.

9. The position taken by Dertliev concerning the personal files is wrong because this protects the powerful weapon of the BSP used for blackmailing and keeping the deputies obedient. Instead of demanding that the files be made accessible to anyone who is interested, something that could have been accomplished quickly and easily through an act of parliament, Dertliev remained silent and prevented the nation from finding out who were its unworthy and its worthy sons.

10. Dertliev created the SDS-Center [Union of Democratic Forces-Center] and proclaimed the creation of a social state and a sociomarket economy. This suited the BSP perfectly. He explained his actions with the wish to draw votes away from the BSP. However, this was impossible because it would make no sense for anyone to leave the BSP for the sake of a program that, as it were, was the program of his own party. It is obvious, however, that the creation of the SDS-Center disoriented some members of the opposition and, by splitting SDS votes, increased the chances of the BSP.

11. Dertliev participated in drafting a Constitution that lacks the structural idea of a good system and a successful functioning of state authority, thus leading to a poor development of sociostate relations.

12. Although there was general agreement not to raise the question of the monarchy before the country became decommunized, Dertliev nonetheless raised it. This fulfilled the secret wish of the BSP because the question was a means of dividing the opposition.

Look now at the founders of the parliamentary act of holding a referendum about the monarchy: Lukanov, Dertliev, Gin'o Ganev, Boris Avramov, and Petur Beron.

13. Let me also simply note the following spots:

A. Remaining silent on the subject of electoral forgeries and the acceptance of electoral results.

B. Keeping silent concerning the inaction of the Mandate Commission.

C. Failing to draft an economic program.

D. Delaying by one year and four months the drafting of party bylaws, and peremptorily appointing a leadership and peremptorily acting during that time.

E. Through antidemocratic manipulation (in March 1991), drafting a bylaw that legitimizes the existing authoritarian status.

The other half of this twosome is Kornazhev, a noted Sofia lawyer, a very good criminal attorney, and a superb psychologist (with the help of his criminological studies): 61 years old; slightly bent; stocky; healthy and energetic; wears glasses; a full, intelligent-looking face; married; a good family; two daughters, one of whom is married; two grandsons; a wife who is an engineer and who is a good person, intelligent, and loyal. He shares these features of Dertliev's: Nos. 3, 5, 6, and 13.

For 15 years Kornazhev was a member of the highest authority of the bar—the High Council of the Bar (which is a position in the *nomenklatura*)—and remained its member until 10 November 1989. Furthermore, for some 15 years he was a permanent legal television star (a semiofficial duty), dealing with legal problems. It is unlikely that any one of the millions of television viewers could recall anything he said because, actually, those who spoke on television showed up on the screen to say nothing. It is known in legal circles that he has never been interested in politics, state law, constitutional law, history, or economics. Not only what he has said but even a simple glance at his otherwise rich library would confirm this. He thawed 10 years of frozen political disinterest only in February-March of 1990; in March, at the National Party Conference, which dealt exclusively with the party program and bylaws, urged by Dertliev, he chose to discuss the Leipzig trial. He bears Dertliev's spots Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13.

Kornazhev was a member of Lukanov's commission on deformations [abuses of the former regime] from the beginning of December 1989 to the June 1990 elections. Ignoring the existence of a mountain of deformations, he did not raise a single question because, had he done that,

it would have meant reporting in the opposition press that this problem had been ignored. This, however, would have discredited the BSP.

After the opening of the parliament, he chaired that same parliamentary commission. Here as well he remained inactive, hiding behind the complaint that his actions were being blocked by the BSP majority in the commission. However, as any lawyer knows, there are ways of raising a problem by submitting a written petition and, if the problem is ignored, by protesting. In that event, as well, the protests would be published in the opposition press. This would discredit the BSP. Naturally, however, no such action was taken.

It must be stressed that Kornazhev's spot No. 8 is significantly wider than Dertliev's. Kornazhev is chairman of the parliamentary commission, yet he does not raise the question of the most important and significant crime of tremendous propaganda effect—that is, the crime of treason against the homeland.

The Bulgarian Lawyers Union was founded on 15 December 1989. Through successful manipulation, its leadership consisted essentially of members of the *nomenklatura*. Kornazhev became its chairman. This was an organization of 1,000 lawyers, with money and tremendous intellectual potential, who could publish a newspaper, engage in extensive social activities, and acquire a tremendous reputation. However, nothing of the sort occurred because both Kornazhev and Nikola Katsarski, the deputy chairman, broke up this organization through their inaction. Actually, that was why they had been elected. For the past year and three months, this organization has acted like a corpse.

The Bible says, "By their deeds [fruits] ye shall know them." Logically thinking, anyone could determine whether those spots were accidental, the result of ignorance, or deliberate. We must remember, however, that, whether accidentally or deliberately, a beetle always goes to the manure. The best thing is that, in either case, the conclusion remains the same: Do not follow the beetle.

To be conscientious, let me report the following fact: In its issue No. 14 of 4 April 1991, in an article on parliamentary informers, SVOBODA, the weekly publication of the Plovdiv SDS, wrote: "Clear hints are being made about a 'noted Sofia lawyer,' particularly active in parliament, whose name may be found in the files of State Security under the innocent pseudonym 'Yuri.'"

#### Dertliev's Response

91BA0921B Sofia SVOBODA NAROD in Bulgarian  
16 Jul 91 pp 1-2

[Article by Dr. Petur Dertliev: "Stupidity Is the Unit Measurement of Infinity"]

[Text] Ever since the BSDP [Bulgarian Social Democratic Party] was restored and gathered strength, a merciless attack was launched against it and against me, as its representative.

The Communists were the first, and they had a reason for so doing. They know that, wherever social democracy is strong, there is no place for communism.

I have been accused of all sorts of things. In parliament, the notorious Mr. Vagenshtayn accused me, with tearful sentimentality, of merciless persecution of the Communists and of threatening even his small sweet granddaughter, Dzheki.

From that point on, the threat developed into specific charges. In anonymous letters, I was accused of committing no fewer than 11 murders. In brief, I was considered a cannibal. However, this was only the appetizer of what was to follow, when I dared to express my view, which was different from that of my allies of yesterday in the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces]. A well-organized and guided attack was mounted, which was joined by a large number of anonymous volunteers. Hints and syllogisms in the Coordination Council were expanded by rumors on a lower level, the offspring of a sick imagination, and writings in which political ignorance can be equated only with immoral speculation. Unfortunately, DEMOKRATSIYA was not last in this campaign. People without pasts or with pasts about which the less said the better have poured mud on me from the dirtiest corners of their souls, with the sole objective that, if no one else is clean, no one will notice that they are dirty.

The latest gem in this sequence is the article "When the Spots Increase on the Face of the Sun," published in issue No. 24 of 9-13 July 1991 and reprinted in No. 124 of DEMOKRATSIYA, dated 12 July 1991. I know Ivan Lilov, the author. In the past, he stunned me by confiding that he had been preparing himself for the position of prime minister since the age of seven. I was unable to grant his wish. I plead guilty. Later, he supplied me, weekly, with 15 to 20 pages of advice and analyses. But, back to the topic: I shall not discuss the versified work with which he begins, and which is worthy of the pen of the trite poet Parushev, familiar to the older generation of Sofia people. Here is a quotation in the same style, author unknown—was it Lilov, Dertliev, or someone else? "Since childhood, in my spirit and to this day, I have had endless dreams—to become a daring fighter for democracy and to shed my blood for it and for my people; to be a thunderous tribune and, with a powerful discourse, to accelerate well-being and cultural upsurge; to become a ruler and, together with you, to bring lasting order in society so that our deeds will shine in the chronicles of the people." I think this would fit Parushev's style quite well.

The ignorance of this gentleman can be seen from virtually the first lines. "Point 7. Opposition deputy and the only living member of the parliamentary opposition

group (15 December 1945-6 December 1946)." Apparently this gentleman does not know that the 1945 elections were boycotted by the opposition. He makes the great discovery that the social democrats support democratic socialism! By "democratic socialism," all social democratic parties in the West and elsewhere in the world mean social democracy. This "democratic socialism," however, has nothing in common with the newly hatched "democratic socialism" of the former BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] and now the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party]. Our International is known as socialist. In all likelihood, Mr. Lilov will wisely proclaim the "Socialist International" as being communist.

This gentleman also promoted Yanko Yankov to deputy chairman of the BSDP. Apparently the conflict with Yanko Yankov was that of Marxism versus non-Marxism. The fact that Yanko Yankov recently said that he had never been a social democrat does not say anything to the author. I would be interested in reading some of these economic articles.

The "truth" is being enriched with the following argument, as well: "By the end of November 1990, Mircho Spasov...reported that Dertliev was informing the State Security on the anticommunist activities of Krust'o Pastukhov, the leader of the BSDP." I do not know why Mr. Lilov killed Mircho Spasov, but, obviously, he had been prompted to say this, and the reprint in DEMOKRATSIYA indicates that the report comes from the old sage Khristozov, who, in the newspaper MISUL, which is obviously close to Mr. Lilov's heart, accused me and Milan Drenchev of having informed, before and after 9 September 1944, about Krust'o Pastukhov and Nikola Petkov, respectively. Both Mr. Drenchev and I deemed and still deem it contemptible to answer people of Mr. Khristozov's caliber. I hope that no sensible person would believe that the communists would keep such valuable agents in prison.

I do not know whether Minister Pushkarov, the former party secretary of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, would be particularly flattered by the following phrase: "He cleansed himself of Marxist economic accretions...and formed a group whose demands were quite similar to those of Yanko Yankov's group." As to Mr. Pushkarov's becoming a member of the Council of Ministers, let me say that, at the Shumen conference of the BSDP, Mr. Pushkarov voted for nonparticipation in a coalition government with the Communists. Later, when it became clear that it would be necessary to form a cabinet with the joint participation of the SDS and the BSP, Mr. Pushkarov joined it without requesting the agreement of the BSDP leadership. At that time, I stated in an interview that he is a member of the government as

an SDS expert. However, this did not satisfy the minister, who said that, for the first time in 45 years, the BSDP has its own minister and would pursue a social democratic policy. He thus indicated his intention of involving the BSDP in his actions. As for myself, I was not a go-between, but I was asked and authorized by the SDS parliamentary union to conduct the talks leading to the formation of a cabinet. I complied with this decision, although I held a view different from the one that I was asked to defend.

The peak of Mr. Lilov's intellectual capacities is the fact that "I did not raise the question of Macedonianism." Mr. Lilov, it was for the first time in 1944—please remember, 1944 and not 1991—that one Dertliev, that time Anton (my father), publicly refuted Professor Vlahov by proclaiming the Bulgarian nature of the population along the Struma River. The Serbian chauvinists hurled all sorts of epithets at his son and did not allow him to put flowers on Gotse Delchev's grave.

I admit my sin of favoring a social state and a social market economy. Many people fiercely objected to including in the Constitution the fact that Bulgaria is a "social" state. One of them was Stefan Savov. However, I had the pleasure of hearing him say that the democrats, as well, favor a social market economy. He was followed by Stoyan Ganev with the three social democratic slogans: "freedom, justice, cohesion." What can one do, Mr. Lilov? It is only a rich house that can be burgled from all sides.

Naturally, Dertliev is to be blamed for the fact that the Mandate Commission did not do its work! It did not conclude its work because of the foolish stubbornness of the BSP concerning Stoyan Ganev's mandate. Would you have suggested that I agree with them and accept throwing him out?

Finally, here is a "fact." Mr. Lilov reports that I sent a telegram to Stalin in November 1944 on the occasion of the October Revolution. It would be interesting to learn how Petur Dertliev, a mobilized officer who was still uninvolved in political life, including the Fatherland Front, could send a telegram to Stalin. It is said that stupidity is the unit measure of infinity.

For a long time I failed to pay attention to the slander. I knew that during those best forgotten years many ridiculous characters existed. One simply had to spit and ignore them. It seems, apparently, that I shall have to change my attitude. It turns out that anything despicable is accepted by the people quite readily, with some kind of blind faith and thoughtless enjoyment.

This has led me to sue some such noted artists in the field of slander. One of them will be Mr. Lilov, accompanied by Mr. Trendafilov.



## Federal Referendum Bill Approved

### What It Says

91CH0744A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech  
19 Jul 91 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Referendum: Who and How"]

[Text] A referendum is called by the president at the suggestion of the CSFR Federal Assembly or the National Councils within 15 days after their request. He cannot do so in the five-month period preceding elections. The referendum can be only on two issues: Constitutional arrangement; one of the republics leaving the federation.

### How Deputies Voted

91CH0744B Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech  
19 Jul 91 p 2

[Unattributed report: "How They Voted: Slovak National Party Against; Christian Democratic Movement Changed Its Position"]

[Text] The constitutional law on referendum was approved by the Parliament yesterday only in the second round of voting. The law was blocked in the first round by the Slovak part of the Chamber of Nations (45 votes are necessary; of course, of the 57 deputies present 35 voted for, six against, and 16 abstained), and as a look at the voting record suggests, it was primarily the work of the deputies of the Slovak National Party [SNS] and the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH].

The SNS deputies were "exemplary"—they voted unanimously against (O. Andelova, E. Bastigal, O. Pavukova, L. Roman, J. Syc, J. Sedovic, and M. Vrabec). Only those who were not present did not vote against. Of the KDH deputies, A. Petrovic and I. Plansky voted against, I. Simko (chairman of the KDH Deputies' Club), P. Cicmanec, and J. Bobovnický voted in favor. But the rest of them abstained, and these were precisely the votes that were lacking. From among the deputies of other movements and parties Communist V. Minac, P. Burian and E. Zalezakova (both without political affiliation) voted against the law on referendum. Four deputies of the Movement for Democratic Slovakia abstained from voting, others (among them Meciar and M. Knazko) were not present. Deputies of other movements and parties voted in favor. In the second round of voting the ratio in the Slovak part of the Chamber of Nations was: 49 for, four against, two abstained. KDH deputies were primarily the ones who changed their vote.

### Czech Editorial Comment

91CH0744C Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech  
20 Jul 91 p 1

[Editorial by Jiri Hanak: "Dependably and Dangerously"]

[Text] I always thought that the words of the Catholic song "where human senses grow weak, faith means

everything" can be applied in toto to the practices of communist parties. Thursday taught me that even to a part of the Federal Parliament can be applied, although in a modified version, a similar idea: "where political senses grow weak, property means everything!" The law on referendum did not pass in the first round of voting because of the question of dividing property in case Czechoslovakia is divided into two independent states.

It was brought about by a group of people of a peculiar stamp, ensconced in the Slovak part of the Chamber of Nations. These people with the mentality of revelers at a feast, convinced that the feast belongs to them, really behave as if they had a long-term and safe tenure in the Parliament. But we cannot be surprised at the behavior of these deputies. They control the explosive charge which was slipped into the Parliament by Comrade Husak already when the federation was structured in 1968. This explosive charge is called the antimajorization law and it works this way: The Federal Parliament cannot approve any important law unless the majority of the Slovak part of the Chamber of Nations votes in favor of it.

It works dependably and dangerously. Few of us realize that a year ago Vaclav Havel was elected president by a margin of only 10 votes. Because, the fact that 280 deputies voted for him carried no weight. If he had not received the needed majority in the Slovak part of the Chamber of Nations he would not have been elected. It also represents, to a certain degree, a landmine for the confederation: a small example of how the possible confederation would function.

In the end, the law on referendum was approved after a compromise was reached. Praise be to God, not to the Parliament. It is, in our opinion, one of the most important laws today. Now the point is to use it as soon as possible. There is little time, five months before the elections it can no longer be used. Coincidentally, the constitutional arrangement did not cause Vikarky, Budmerice, Kromeriz, et al. to move an inch. There is danger in delay. Let the citizen—the voter—decide.

### Federal Minister on New Slovak Ministry

91CH0736A Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 16 Jul 91 p 4

[Interview with Emil Ehrenberger, federal minister of communications, by Marta Ruzickova; place and date not given: "Political, Not Professional, Viewpoint Prevailed"—first paragraph is SMENA introduction]

[Text] The transfer of some powers to the national republics led the Slovak government to propose to the Slovak National Council that it establish a Slovak Ministry of Transportation and Communications. It took place at the 16th session of the Slovak National Council on Wednesday last week. At the time when this Slovak ministry was being approved, the federal minister of

communications, Emil Ehrenberger, whose disagreement with the establishment of this ministry in Slovakia was already known earlier, was also present in the Parliament.

[Ruzickova] A while ago the deputies decided to establish the Ministry of Transportation and Communications in Slovakia. What is your position on this matter now?

[Ehrenberger] My view, that it is necessary to observe the constitutional law on powers, is known. I still think that communications in every state should be centrally directed, whether it is because of the international obligations we have in that respect, or because of the cohesive network that was already being built during the First Republic. I see complications in the fact that another agency of state administration has been established which will certainly be interested in managing communications in Slovakia, and thus the accustomed form of strict control from one center, such as exists in almost all countries, will no longer be possible to implement. All contacts with foreign partners and questions of building a network in the republic will have to go through complicated negotiations at the level of three ministries. I do not see at this time a guarantee that this will be beneficial, that it will speed up development of communications, or that something could be gained by it.

[Ruzickova] But the coalition partners in Slovakia fully supported the creation of this ministry, and the Democratic Party already has its own candidate ready for the minister's position....

[Ehrenberger] The constitutional law says in Article 20, Paragraph e, that the Federal Ministry of Communications shall organize and administer the telecommunications system. In the paragraph that precedes it, it says that the Federal Ministry of Communications shall organize the postal system. If I go by this wording of the law and if the Ministry is to administer the telecommunications system at the federal level, then it can administer it under the founder's authority in the case when in accordance with the law on state enterprise the founder is the administrator. Or in other words, who administers is the founder. Of course, because the word "administer" is not contained in the preceding paragraph of the constitutional law, it is relatively logical that the founder's authority over the postal system is transferred to the republics. From the very beginning, the delimiting protocol has actually broken the constitutional law. From the standpoint of one who is responsible for directing telecommunications, I have the obligation to observe this constitutional law. I have been so charged by the resolutions of the economic committees of both houses of the Federal Assembly as well as by the Federal Government.

The whole matter is quite erroneously explained by not putting the founder's authority in context with this wording of the constitutional law. It means that the

republics have quite automatically assumed the founder's authority. Essential as the founder's authority of the Federal Ministry of Communications is at the moment, it is important mainly because at this time the reorganization of communications is very necessary. And only a founder can carry out a reorganization. But because the founder's authorities were transferred to the republics by the bad delimiting protocol in contradiction with the constitutional law, it is very difficult to imagine how the newly constituted departments will operate. The state communications enterprises in the Republic quickly realized that they can live in peace and that no reorganization will occur.

They no longer respect the Federal Ministry of Communications and there is actually a kind of anarchy—a disintegrated economic administration. That is also why I consider the establishment and approval of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications to be a complication, because it will be six months before the ministry will begin to function, perhaps even a year, and that also presents a certain great danger. There will be no founder, there will be nobody to carry out the reorganization, and the preelection campaign, which will place great demands on communications, will use communications in which the old structures predominate, where there are great numbers of former State Security members. This danger is all the greater because there is no guarantee of equal procedures in the two republics. The Federal Ministry of Communications has a legitimate reason to carry out from a single center and by the same method a quick reorganization which would be effective and which would make it possible to clean up the system.

[Ruzickova] This matter has placed you, as a representative of Slovakia in the Federal Government, in a complicated situation. Now you will have to explain the stance of the Slovak side.

[Ehrenberger] I have already discussed this problem. It has actually been going on for two months. I discussed it with Ministers Dyb and Belcak, and with the prime ministers of the republics, but unfortunately so far the discussions brought no results. This week—probably tomorrow—there will be discussions on this matter with the prime ministers. This is an important issue which has to be definitively resolved and ended.

[Ruzickova] Am I to understand that the decision of the Slovak parliament could be revised on the basis of these discussions?

[Ehrenberger] You did not understand me. I was talking about authority, not about the establishment of the ministry. Nobody can do anything about that any more. It will go on functioning, even though I think it will be a calamity for this republic. As long as we are to live in a federation. We now came up with a model that was rejected by all developed countries long ago. It is a pity. It will mean a loss of time and maybe also a financial loss for us.

[Ruzickova] At the time you entered your government function, your expertise and the fact that you really understand the problems of communications were emphasized. Was it not possible to convince by arguments those who pushed through their point of view with which you do not agree?

[Ehrenberger] My opinion on communications is shared by many soberly thinking people in communications who are uninvolved in any political programs. This view is also shared by the new people in the Ministry of Communications. They are clean, irreproachable, intelligent people. In spite of all the arguments which we have used thus far in discussions even with the political sponsor—the Christian Democratic Movement—they did not take these arguments into consideration. They do not understand communications. It cannot be held against them, but on the other hand, they pushed through their political viewpoint on communications which is not in accord with what Czecho-Slovak communications urgently need. It is a great pity that some of the responsible politicians think that the communications system can be divided by an imaginary political or an internal geographic boundary. I made a great effort to explain this matter, but to no avail. It foundered on the views of a few political representatives who listened to my arguments with indifference. And so in the end that is the way it is and I am convinced that after time it will have a negative impact.

#### **Common Czech-Slovak State Justified**

91CH0729B Bratislava KULTURNY ZIVOT in Slovak  
9 Jul 91 p 2

["Text" of communique issued by the Executive Committee of the Movement of Czech-Slovak Accord; date not given: "Why a Common State?"]

[Text] The question, "Why should we live in a common state with the Czechs?" was posed by Mr. Prokes to the political representatives of the CSFR, and thus indirectly to us all. We are therefore taking the liberty of giving our answer:

The coexistence of Czechs and Slovaks may be compared to the life of a large family. A family, whose genesis has ancient historical roots, and which the nations of the world have recognized for more than 70 years. This family came into being on the basis of nonviolent processes, on the basis of an awareness of belonging together, on the basis of mutual historical experiences, and in the course of years has created a not inconsiderable wealth. We know of no reason that would give anybody the right to divide and thus inevitably diminish the common material and spiritual wealth of this family. Numbers speak about the possible economic losses. To deprive our nations of the sense of belonging, of linkages and ties created by practically centuries, to give in to intolerance and inability to come to an agreement, we consider to be barbaric. No, we do not deny any nation the right to an independent existence. But we consider

coexistence to be a qualitatively higher form and the ability to coexist to be a higher human value. We believe that our nations have that ability.

In conclusion, we urge people to think about the substance of this question. Will not other ones follow it? Why should we live in a common state with Hungarians, Ruthenians, Jews, Romanians....?

#### **Slovak Daily Describes Voting on Referendum**

##### **Objections of Slovak Deputies**

91CH0738A Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 18 Jul 91  
pp 1-2

[Article by Marta Csontosova: "Does Referendum Really Pose a Threat to Slovakia?"]

[Excerpt] When on Tuesday afternoon the referendum came under discussion at the 16th joint session of the Federal Assembly, it became clear that a decision would not be reached that day. It is not possible, after all, that a problem, the solution to which was submitted in writing by the president (in spite of that, his proposal languished in the Parliament for six months), could be solved by our deputies in three hours.

As expected, the interesting debate continued yesterday morning. This time, the occasionally quite heated debate was quite definitely initiated by the Slovak deputies. Each political party designated one individual from its ranks to speak. And the speeches went accordingly. It must be pointed out that the speeches of the Slovak deputies were prepared very carefully. But judge for yourselves.

Olga Andelova spoke for the Slovak National Party [SNS]. And although she was among the first ones to speak during this debate, it was precisely her speech which became the focus of interest of all the deputies. Because the slender, delicate blonde spoke very harshly. She called the submitted draft unacceptable because it takes away from the Slovak representatives the mandate to take part in deciding the future status of Slovakia, it takes away from the Slovak National Council the right to self-determination of the nation. According to this SNS representative, the Federal Assembly has no right to decide the future of the republics.... Period!

Academician Milan Cic spoke for the Movement for Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]. He expressed concern that the Federal Assembly is rushing the referendum. Of the individual proposed changes he submitted, worth noting is the proposed change of the most controversial Article 5, Paragraph 3, thus: "Property, managed at the time the referendum is called, by CSFR at home and abroad, state financial assets and liabilities of CSFR, the foreign currency reserves of the Czechoslovak State Bank and the federal reserves shall be divided between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic basically according to population numbers. Details shall be determined by law by the Federal Assembly." During the

debate, the representative of the Public Against Violence [VPN], Ernest Valko, also reacted to this part of Article 5. We will not quote him, because the VPN request for the change in the paragraph is totally identical with the request submitted by Deputy Cic. It seems as if Slovakia felt threatened by the submitted draft of the constitutional law on referendum.

After a lengthy period of civilized speeches in the Parliament, Deputy Vitazoslav Moric spoke in a scandalous manner, even accusing the Deputy Prime Minister of the Federal Government, Pavel Rychetsky, of deception, because of his speech on television. Pavel Rychetsky admitted that he absolutely does not understand the SNS position on the referendum.

Just yesterday a seriocomic dialogue between Deputy Moric and Petr Rasev (VPN) took place. Vitazoslav Moric insisted that from the time the common state was first established, Slovaks were classified as "second-rate" and that the center is making no effort to change it. Well, Peter Rasev could not stand it, and from the speaker's podium he confessed that he never thought of himself as "second-rate" and if V. Moric feels like that, he should not attribute such a feeling to the whole nation. The dialogue ended in the lobby, where V. Moric confidentially told Petr Rasev that he is not even "second-rate" but "third-rate." In spite of this "grievous news" actor Peter Rasev did not change his position.

The great number of proposed changes made it impossible to vote on the wording of the law on referendum even yesterday. More time was needed to ponder the proposed changes. Maybe today, then.

We shall use the words of Alfred Hasek (VPN) in reference to the title of this article, to put a full stop after yesterday's debate on the referendum. In his opinion, does the referendum pose a threat to Slovakia? "Not at all, on the contrary, it saves it. People should at last have the possibility to decide, in a democratic way and already this year, whether we shall preserve the federation or break it up. There is only one danger for all of us, and that is that the referendum will threaten the republic as a single entity. I am afraid that today the situation in the Czech lands is what it was in Slovakia a year ago. I have no worries about what the people in Slovakia will say. The nationalists in fact have not succeeded in Slovakia and now they are trying intensively in the Czech lands. They provoke and irritate people in order to evoke in them the conviction that living with the Slovaks is impossible." [passage omitted]

### Most KDH Deputies Abstain

91CH0738B Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 19 Jul 91 p 1

[Article by Marta Csontosova: "Slovaks Do Not Want Referendum"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Just before 1700 hours, the deputies of the Federal Assembly finally came to vote on the constitutional law on referendum in its entirety.

What happened was what was indicated by the voting on the proposed changes: Although the Chamber of the People approved the referendum, the Slovak part of the Chamber of Nations voted against. To better understand the stance of individual political parties it must be noted that most of the KDH [Christian Democratic Movement] deputies abstained, and the SNS [Slovak National Party] deputies very forcefully blocked the law. After negotiations to reach an agreement, the law on referendum was passed, with the proviso that the property distribution between the republics will be determined by a separate constitutional law.

### Leader Discusses Concept of Conservatism

91CH0742A Prague REPORTER in Czech No 28,  
11-17 Jul p 8

[Article by Dr. Jiri V. Kotas, chairman of the Conservative Party Freedom Bloc and president of the Bohemia Bank: "View From the Right; Myths About Extremes That Meet..."]

[Text] We live in a period of time when it pays to comprehend terms. Perhaps the largest number of legends, misinterpretations, and misconceptions pertain today to the basic terms of the political spectrum, to the affinity or divergence between the various coherent world views and tendencies. Right-Center-Left. At first glance an altogether clear political spectrum reaching from here to there. But the problem arises the moment this spectrum is to be applied concretely—such as, say, in Czechoslovakia.

The very concepts of the Right and Left are the legacy of the French Revolution at the end of the 18th century when in the newly established National Assembly the radical Jacobins by mere happenstance congregated on the left side of the hall (a gauche) and defenders of an orderly solution whose brains had not yet been completely carried off by the revolution assembled on the right side (a droit). On the left sat the advocates of the guillotine, whereas those on the right were the creators of a new France who participated in the birth of the modern political world. Since that time, reckless radicals are termed the Left and state-sustaining elements the Right.

To decent people wishing to live in peace and relative prosperity the world "leftist" has become a justifiable term of opprobrium; enemies of catastrophic political experiments are called rightists. "Come on now," says a leftist, Social Democrat, or Communist indignantly: Doesn't the Right have its extreme form in Fascism and Nazism?

Don't believe them, just as you did not believe the leftist ideologues even before November 1989. Both tendencies that have been mentioned—Fascism and Nazism—belong markedly to the Left. The Left sees the citizen as a mere anonymous component of the herd of workers predestined to realize the dreams and visions of their masters.



It is the attitude toward the human individual which can be regarded as the main point of difference between the Right and the Left. Those who examine everything through the prism of benefit for each individual and view collective well-being as the sum total of the well-being of all individuals belong to the Right; those for whom individuals have merged into a anonymous mass to be manipulated solely by force belong to the Left. Fascism, Nazism, Communism, Trotskyism, Maoism or Pol Potism are merely different color varieties of the same disdain for the concrete human individual.

It is no accident that Mussolini started out as a radical socialist and Lenin's close friend and that he regarded Fascism as a higher stage of socialism, and it is definitely no accident that Hitler's NSDAP was a National Socialist party. Mussolini's AVANTI! and LA LOTTA DI CLASSE newspapers were not an accident, nor were Hitler's four-year plans and hatred of capitalism.

Just read newspapers printed during the Protectorate and you will find that their editorials spitting venom at the United States and capitalism in general could be distinguished only by an expert from RUDE PRAVO writing in the 1921-89 period. Nor is it an accident that all totalitarian systems had concentration camps. Here Social Democrats surely become fidgety. They too are of the Left, but this is not what they are about! A difficult case, but nearly every Communist criminal of the 1940's and 1950's had started out as a Social Democrat: Gotwald, Zapotocky, Fierlinger and others.

So can the extreme Right and extreme Left meet together at some point? They can not, there is no place for them to do so. The political spectrum is not a maze of intertwined things but rather a linear affair. The more extreme the positions the farther apart they are. On the left sit Social Democrats, midwives of the bygone Communist totality, next to them trying to outdo each other are Communists, Fascists, Nazis and Trotskyites who regarded even Stalin as insufficiently revolutionary, Maoists, and Pol Potists.

On the Right the situation is a great deal simpler. The Right is conservative in its very essence; it does not like to experiment (incidentally, elections in rightist systems are held regularly and frequently), it builds at a seemingly slow pace but then society holds for centuries without any shocks. One includes here Locke, Burke, Reagan, Mrs. Thatcher as well as Bush.

But where, a supporter of Milos Zeman will ask, do you put Franco, Pinochet, or Chiang Kai-shek? They, too, belong to the Right and moreover conducted a total war against a Communization of their countries. The solid and prosperous Spain's transition from Francoism to a full democracy in the 1970's was applauded by the entire democratic world. In Chile Pinochet stepped down when the votes were counted from a referendum he initiated. The Republic of China, also called Taiwan, is a world-class economic superpower and the extent of democracy there has long surpassed the entire developing world.

Not one of the men we cited should arouse envy. But we must ask how Spain would look like after a leftist victory in the 1930's, whether a referendum would suffice to topple a Communist dictatorship in Chile and whether the island of Taiwan might not have become the Maoists' auxiliary prison.

From this perspective let us look at our own political scene a year before the elections. Whether the original and the newly profiled Right will coalesce in a single Conservative Party or a strong electoral bloc is something that developments in the next few months will show. Unfortunately we don't have as much time as they once had in England or the United States where the formation of a conservative Right took several decades. A political center also has defined itself, even though the only certain thing is that it does not go along with the Right. I believe that the Civic Forum will not join the future Social Democratic-Communist camp either.

Seemingly apart from this stream is a strange alliance of racists, asocial types, and one former censor, under the greatly misleading name SPR-RSC [Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia]. The American Republicans, whose party of slavery opponents was founded by President Lincoln, may have sighed over this contemporary borrowing by the Sladek crown just as they probably did over the German also-Republicans of Mr. Schoenhuber. In America the leader of such a group would call on his membership at least once a month to contribute bail money to keep him out of jail. The Sladek crowd are not a Right but rather a Mussolini-type Left, a political fringe slime.

Our voter today is faced with a significantly broader spectrum of political parties which will conduct a spirited contest for his support in the coming year. The modern conservative Right faces a complex process of unification and subsequently a struggle against adversaries, but it has something to fall back on. Political stability and a dynamic economy of the modern world speak for themselves.

#### **Official Alleges Disagreement Within KDH**

*91CH0743A Bratislava PRACA in Slovak 18 Jul 91  
pp 1, 3*

[Interview with Dr. Tibor Bohm, member of the Christian Democratic Movement Council, by Dusan Harnadek; place and date not given: "A Pretense of Unity? From the Movement's Back Stage; View of the Kromeriz Talks; Ideas on Future Arrangement of State Powers"—first paragraph is PRACA introduction]

[Text] Following the draft on an agreement on the Czech and Slovak Republics' arrangement of state powers presented by the CNR [Czech National Council] chairwoman Dagmar Buresova, the public was offered a VPN [Public Against Violence] treaty draft and a KDH [Christian Democratic Movement] draft of a state treaty. Recently we solicited the views of government and legal

experts on the proposal by D. Buresova. Today we interview Dr. Tibor Bohm, a KDH Council member, on this topic.

[Harnadek] How do you view the current processes in Europe involving integrative and disintegrative trends in state formations from a global geopolitical perspective, and how in this context do you see the issue of a state power arrangement to govern Czech-Slovak relations?

[Bohm] It does not seem to me that the current integrative and disintegrative trends in Europe are wholly contradictory and mutually exclusive. Tendencies toward integration are found mainly in nations which have enjoyed several decades or even centuries of their own statehood. Nations which have been unable to constitute themselves as a whole into states, especially in consequence of Great Power policies, are expressing ever more convincingly a desire to proclaim their independence and state sovereignty. With this goal achieved, that is, in possession of their statehood, they too will seek integration with the European Community mainly on security, economic as well as political grounds. For these reasons I consider a reverse process to be naive and unrealistic. For Slovakia the first thing must be to assert itself on the European as well as on world level as a sovereign nation making up an independent state unit. When Europe sees and perceives us in this manner it will recognize that we too are entitled to our own place within the European Community's framework. We don't have to apply to enter Europe because we are in Europe. We will apply only to the European Community but prior to that we must attain our sovereignty and statehood. The more than 70 years of Czechs and Slovaks sharing life in a single state have not stood the test of time. Those were years of mutual suspicion, mistrust which under certain conditions grew into actual hatred. This can be prevented only if we take advantage of our natural right and become a sovereign nation. Then we can share our life on sincere and brotherly terms and together, as two sovereign states, we will be able to confidently aid and protect each other. This will be a convincing and genuine proof of our striving for integration.

[Harnadek] The KDH together with the VPN and the DS [Democratic Party] form the governing coalition. A prerequisite for the acceptance of a constitutional act needed to ratify the treaty is the assent of a qualified (three-fifths) majority in Parliament. In view of this it can be assumed that the Slovak Parliament will present to the Czech political representation a joint draft of such a treaty agreed upon in the Parliament, which presupposes a certain cooperation with the opposition. The Czech political representation has already presented such a joint draft put before the public by Dagmar Buresova. It was expected that at least the governing coalition will put a joint draft before the Slovak public. How do you assess cooperation on drafting the treaty from this perspective?

[Bohm] I think that neither the movements nor the parties of the governing coalition will have an easy time to unite on a joint draft of the treaty. This of course provided that they will respect the opinions of their members and supporters.

It is particularly KDH and the HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] and SNS [Slovak National Party] who should take the initiative, find a common denominator, and win over the other parties and movements including those outside the Parliament.

[Harnadek] Could you assess the treaty draft presented by VPN and also comment on the draft agreement presented by Dagmar Buresova?

[Bohm] The VPN draft of a treaty on the arrangement of the CR [Czech Republic] and SR [Slovak Republic] powers tends toward a strong federation. The extent of Federal Powers in Art. 4 of the treaty is so broad that I have a hard time finding the dividing line between federation and a unitary state. As for the draft of an agreement presented by Dagmar Buresova, my view is that it belittles in a rather undisguised manner the Slovak nation's self-determination right to sovereignty. I believe this is precisely the kind of agreement that is redundant and on which President Havel commented casually that it will quickly expire by itself. Essentially it can be said that the agreement respects the civic principle rather than the national one, which contrasts also with the trend in other European states all of which recognize the national principle.

[Harnadek] What are KDH's ideas on a future state power arrangement governing Czech-Slovak relations? How does the movement intend to press for the main principles set forth in its election program—that is, SR sovereignty, fully equal participation of the Slovak nation in the all-European community and abolition of the federation's exclusive powers in the area of foreign policy, defense, currency policies and so on?

[Bohm] There are at least two sets of ideas on this in the movement—one held by some members of the leadership (presidium) and different ideas among other members and sympathizers. This double track would not have developed had we not engaged in self-deception, had we not proceeded as at the latest Council meeting on 22 Jun 91 when the Council was asked for a post-factum approval of the position taken in the Kromeriz talks. This draft was never presented to the Council in writing, it did not contain a reference to federation even though its content makes clear that it involves a federative arrangement. So I think I can say that one part of the KDH meeting's participants did not understand what they were voting for and the other part voted in a public vote obediently as befits paid KDH functionaries and representatives.

I cannot suppress the feeling that within the KDH's Council of Representatives too there are quite a few who have reservations toward a strong federation and tend rather toward a confederative arrangement of state

powers. They only need more boldness and courage. It is not my intention here to engage in polemics with Eng. Martin Culen, member of the KDH Presidium Council, who alone at the 4 Jul 91 Presidium meeting sought to convince me that according to his findings the okres membership base backs the position adopted at Kromeriz. If KDH abstains from tactical maneuvering and sticks to its principles which you cited in your question, it can be a successful movement and can help the Slovak cause. I have expressed my ideas on the state powers arrangement publically on many occasions. I see it as the only correct approach in proclaiming the sovereignty and independence of the Slovak nation. Afterward, it is drafting the SR Constitution and only subsequently it is time in my opinion to conclude an interstate treaty between the CR and SR. The treaty should contain agreement on certain powers in the area of defense, foreign policy and currency. The state treaty draft presented by KDH in my opinion gives too great a latitude to the federal bodies which are envisioned. Not only I myself but I believe also the majority of KDH members as well as its sympathizers have interpreted the KDH election program's principles in the sense that they should lead more toward a confederative arrangement than actually emerges from the draft state treaty presented by KDH, even though it does not expressly mention federation. Reactions from individual KDH members which I have been receiving from all over Slovakia also support my definite conclusion that there has been disappointment in the membership ranks. It was precisely these proclaimed principles of the election program which the membership base interpreted as leading to the strongest possible sovereign status of Slovakia, and not to this kind of a federation status.

In this connection I should like to emphasize that the way we now arrange our state powers relationship is the way we are going to have it for several decades ahead. If at this time we fail to assert our right to self-determination, how will we assert it in the next 50 years? I regret to say that our national consciousness is weaker than it was at the end of the 1930's. Who will guarantee us that this will not lead to our national ruin? Slovaks, let us think about it before it is too late!

#### **ODS Deputy Chairman Describes Party Views**

91CH0760A Prague OBCANSKY DENIK in Czech  
17 Jul 91 p 4

[Interview with Miroslav Macek, deputy chairman of the Civic Democratic Party, by Jiri Michal; place and date not given: "Rightist Confidence-Building Bridges"]

[Text] [Michal] In recent times, nothing much is being heard about the Civic Democratic Party [ODS]. But that certainly does not mean that you are not doing anything.

[Macek] I consider it to be a good sign that nothing is being heard about our party. This means that work is being accomplished. Politics, as was already stated by T.G. Masaryk, is everyday clerical activity. And it is

precisely that which is currently happening within the ODS. We are taking on members, we are seeking the best workers, ties and communications channels are being clarified, etc. In October-November, a regular congress is scheduled to be held which would bring this phase of establishing the party to a conclusion and would outline further steps forward which essentially entail preparations for the 1992 elections. The second reason why not too much is being heard about the ODS: we are one of the few parties which is not experiencing an internal conflict, be it because of differing views within the party or as a result of personal ambitions to acquire a position.

[Michal] Will you be discussing the question of collaborating or amalgamating with coalition partners at the congress?

[Macek] I believe so. Negotiations are ongoing with possible preelection as well as postelection partners. The negotiations are preliminary in nature, they are designed to sound out our potential partners, we are making efforts to build bridges of confidence, something which is an essential condition for any kind of collaboration.

[Michal] Will personal ambitions not create problems in establishing closer relationships?

[Macek] Personal ambitions always play a role. From the moment the ODS came into being, would-be coalition partners have been heard from suggesting that we unite with them, divide up portfolios, and continue on together. We did not consider this procedure to be the best. We indicated to interested parties that, to the extent to which they wish to unite with us, they should dissolve their own parties and register with the ODS as individual members at the place of their permanent residence. To the extent to which they have—and they do have—strong personalities within their ranks, it cannot be too long before these individuals will assert themselves within a few months.

[Michal] Would the same fate befall the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA]? After all, its program is virtually identical and the party actually has a number of strong political personalities in its ranks. I am not certain that its leadership would wish to proceed along this path.

[Macek] Even I do not believe that this will happen. It is possible to find an analogy elsewhere in the world, where parties, but more likely political clubs, whose members do not wish to be members of political parties for the most varied reasons, exist alongside large political parties. From the very beginning, the ODA more likely aspired to the role of such an exclusive club. On the one hand, this is comfortable because the membership base is a complex living organism. On the other hand, one of the most important things is missing and this is the feedback reflex of the membership base which permanently influences the policies of the leadership. The nonexistence of this reflex can be dangerous in politics.

[Michal] All parties are confronted with one serious problem. Will Czechoslovakia continue to exist or will it

disintegrate? In view of the conduct of the Slovak representation, skepticism is deepening on the Czech side. How do you judge the current status and how do you evaluate the proposal made by Mr. Meciar, which calls for the creation of a cross section Club of Slovak Deputies in the Federal Assembly, the mission of which would be to watch over the advantageous nature of Slovak interests?

[Macek] I personally am a skeptic—something which I have already expressed in the course of the hyphen war. There are several factors here which compel a person to express this feeling. On the one hand, it is the historical origin of Czechoslovakia, a state which was created more or less artificially. It is a fact that both parts of the state developed along different lines for centuries. A second reason is the problem of a two-member federation. If a two-member federation is to be balanced, this requires a permanent and unregimented rational balancing. However, nationalism is an irrational moment. To balance a two-member system, which is based on a national principle, is an impossibility.

The only solution would be something which is essentially not doable today, namely to liquidate the two-member federation based on the national principle and to create a multimember federation based on a territorial principle. I can visualize a state made up of Bohemia, Moravia-Silesia, and Slovakia, which territories would have similar jurisdictions to those held by today's republics, which could be somewhat larger in some respects and somewhat smaller in others. I can also visualize a federal state made up of two or three territories, a capital city and a state (similar to the Federal Republic of Germany). Essentially, the balancing of jurisdictions on a principle other than the national principle is more rational.

Meciar's proposal to establish a Club of Slovak Deputies, made up of all Slovak parties, which would oversee and consider whether adopted laws are advantageous to Slovakia, is an example of irrational consideration. After all, every law adopted in the Federal Assembly must be advantageous to both components of the federation and cannot be advantageous only to Slovakia. The fundamental principle for this proposal is to frustrate the functioning of the state.

I am afraid that the thinking and actions undertaken by a part of the Slovak politicians is slowly, but surely heading in the direction of partitioning, both legislatively and also economically. In actual fact, the republics are beginning to distance themselves from each other. Among the members of the ODS, the opinion is beginning to prevail that the Czechoslovak Republic will, in the long run, be made up only of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia.

[Michal] Do you not therefore feel that the Slovak representation is maneuvering with many concepts because it would more or less like to see Slovakia become

independent, but must pay attention to the prevailing views of the Slovak population which favor staying together?

[Macek] Slovak politicians are aware of the fact that the response of the majority of the population would favor the retention of a common state. All right, we shall decide in favor of a common state, but we shall be precisely where we are today. A referendum would have to deal with the question as to what type of principles (jurisdictions) should go into the makeup of the state. The referendum would then contain two sides to the questions; it would be a referendum on a jurisdictional law. But that is then no longer a referendum.

I personally consider a referendum to be absurd because both the Czechs as well as the Slovaks elected their representatives to the Federal Assembly. They gave them a mandate, which means that the above-named process should take place in the forum of the Federal Assembly. To circumvent the task of the Federal Assembly by a referendum is absurd. Thanks to the prohibition of a simple majority vote, the Federal Assembly cannot adopt anything which would be unfavorable either for one or another of the republics.

[Michal] Only it would seem that we know this to be true only in this republic. According to the results of a public opinion poll, Slovakia is suffering from the greatest lack of confidence in the federal establishment. It would seem that no matter what decision is published by the federal establishment, it is a priori accepted by the Slovak side with a lack of confidence, if it is not rejected. It is as though, little by little, this organ was invalid for one part of the state.

[Macek] This is a typical example of irrationality, when a considerable portion of the Slovaks believe that the Federal Assembly is something set against them although, precisely as a result of the prohibition of a simple majority vote, this is not even possible.

[Michal] Judging by the recent actions of the Federal Assembly, it would appear that the Slovak representation is afraid of the discussions of the referendum law and attempted to thwart them.

[Macek] This is true. On the other side, the results of the referendum in the Czech Lands is a whole other question, particularly in the event it becomes necessary to accept a state treaty. Some time ago, the ODS made a proposal that the Czech National Council adopt a law on a referendum as insurance against the Slovak National Council, adopting a Slovak constitution sometime in the future and offering the Czech Lands a state treaty. At this moment, neither the government nor the Czech National Council hold a mandate from the population to undertake anything. Here, it is precisely that a referendum would play a role by asking the question "Do you wish to accept a state treaty with the Slovak Republic or not?" This would facilitate further negotiations.



[Michal] I would turn attention to yet another of your political tendencies. Are you still considering expanding the ODS to include Slovakia?

[Macek] We never had a tendency to expand in that direction. We believed that, sooner or later, a party which would be very near to our views would come into being in Slovakia. We negotiated with the VPN [Public Against Violence]. We also held negotiations with the New Right, which is, however, more like a political association of economists who favor the principle of a market economy. Some time ago, these individuals established the Civic Party of Slovakia [OSS] which would be a sister organization for the ODS in Slovakia. In the future, there is also the possibility of a bloc alliance such as exists between the CDU/CSU.

However, we see the following problems in Slovakia: There are not overly many people there who might identify with rightist views and the right there lacks a clearly strong charismatic personality. And it is necessary that such a personality be found. Such a personality—even though he is on another side of the political spectrum—is only Mr. Meciár.

[Michal] I gained the feeling earlier that you also wanted to focus on the farm population. In view of the fact that, for the time being, there still is not a large peasant party here, the peasants represent a large number of potential voters. Is this feeling of mine valid even for the future?

[Macek] The concept of an agricultural policy is being worked on. But others are also being worked on which are to become the foundation of the election program. However, it is not enough to have a good agricultural concept, but it is necessary to have the required levers for its implementation.

Great reservations are beginning to be heard again with respect to the work of the Ministry of Agriculture and Minister Kubat, even from the side of the Civic Democratic Alliance, which was supporting him until recently. Clearly, within a very short time, there will be efforts to resolve this problem, even on a personnel basis. Minister Kubat is always full of big words, but short on actual achievements. I became definitively convinced of this about two weeks ago on the occasion of his meeting with representatives of private farmers, where he very vociferously defended himself and alleged that efforts to depose him are being orchestrated from Slusovice, because he is the only one who sees the way things are and can give them what for. He even announced that within three weeks we shall see with what sort of Slusovice we are dealing. Two months have passed and, of course, nothing is happening.

[Michal] Recently, the committees of the Federal Assembly have been debating the law on political parties. As one of a few parties, you have opposed the state in its efforts to finalize the formation of political parties. What reasons are compelling you to take this stand?

[Macek] That is simple. Let us ask the question: Is such a law really necessary? There are states where such a law does not exist. Wherever such a law does exist, it regulates the position of political parties differently from other similar entities within the state. Where such a law does not exist, the existence of such laws as those protecting the right of assembly, the right of association, laws governing the activities of organizations benefiting the public good, etc., are sufficient. Political parties can then acquire gifts, contributions, they can engage in entrepreneurial activities, but only within a certain framework.

[Michal] But if subsidies exist in other countries, there must also be reasons for that.

[Macek] They exist in Germany, Austria, Sweden, and elsewhere. I did some work in this area and I found out that this subsidizing law was always adopted by social democratic governments or by governments of socialists wherever it was in fact adopted. All conservative parties always opposed subsidies because they assume that every citizen should have the right to make his own decisions as to which party to which he will contribute and which party to which he will not contribute and the state should not use his taxes to subsidize a party with whose policies the citizen does not agree. And this is what would happen if the state subsidized political parties.

[Michal] But in the event such a law is not adopted, would not the small parties be immediately defeated? Would not only the large parties, which even include Communists, be the only ones to profit? Given the continuous development of the political spectrum, would this not be an undeserved advantage for the large political parties?

[Macek] If we wish to be a stabilized society, we should take over the laws which are typical for a stable society as quickly as possible and we should shun the intermediate laws which, once adopted, will be difficult to change.

[Michal] Is not the position of your party guided also by the fact that you are already a large party, you have a membership, you have financial support from abroad, and are thus in a more advantageous position at the starting line?

[Macek] Where do we have the advantage? We only have 17,000 members, the Communists claim we have 400,000. And there are other larger parties than ours. Moreover, the rules governing the life of the political spectrum without subsidies have the advantage of compelling the parties and little parties to unite, to amalgamate, and, very quickly, the result is a striven-for model—namely that one large party will form on the left and one on the right and not, as was the case after World War I in this country, or at the end of World War II in Germany, where the number of parties was in the tens. In other words, why should one defend against the action of such a law without subsidies?

Moreover, there is yet another argument here. The parties claim that they must be supported by the state, that they would encounter problems with maintaining their existence, etc. However, if any kind of organism exists which is not capable of taking care of itself, how, in God's name, does it hope to take care of the state? If I am not personally able to prosper economically, how am I to lead a prospering state?

### Slusovice Scandal Said To Involve StB

91CH0742B Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech  
20 Jul 91 p 1

[Article by (ju, JaD): "Investigator in Flight; Zlin Police Officer Hiding in Zurich; Swiss Paper on Slusovice; Alleged Suicide of Informer"]

[Text] The Swiss paper WELTWOCHTE on 18 July carried a major article on the "Slusovice Mafia." Participating in its preparation was Captain Alexej Zak, an investigator of the Zlin police force who, according to the weekly's information, in fear for his life secretly crossed the Czechoslovak border with his family and presently is hiding in Switzerland.

According to WELTWOCHTE there was on 25 June a confidential meeting in the office of the Federal Minister of the Interior Jan Langos which was attended also by his deputy Jan Rumil, the Czech Republic Minister of Agriculture Bohumil Kubat and Federal Assembly Deputy Stanislav Devaty. The only topic was "the Slusovice affair." Jan Rumil reportedly presented information showing that the head of the special investigating team which had been investigating this affair since April 1991 was Maj. Kukacka, formerly on the staff of the 5th Administration of the StB [State Security] charged with protection of State and Party functionaries. His commanding officer at the time was Vaclav Kilian who is presently one of the cooperative's top managers.

According to WELTWOCHTE, following the meeting Minister Langos set up a completely new investigating team and personally informed the President of the Republic.

On 27 June Alexej Zak together with his wife and three children left his apartment in Uherske Hradiste and with the help of friends on the police force reached the state border. There, again according to the article, they were taken under the wings of "other friends" who had had contacts in the past with Czechoslovak intelligence. At present the whole family is reportedly in Switzerland. "Did he have to flee because the state is unable to protect him?" asks the article commenting on the history of the Slusovice agrocombine and its breakup.

In January 1991 one of Zak's informers was found dead in the garage of his home. It was officially listed as a suicide but Alexej Zak contends that he did not have the slightest motive for killing himself. When he requested permission to investigate, he did not even get to the paperwork.

The article claims that Slusovice chairman Frantisek Cuba conducted negotiations about transferring the company's assets to Slovakia already with the former Prime Minister Meciar.

The article in the WELTWOCHTE weekly contains in addition to remarkable bits of information also a number of conjectures. So for instance Alexej Zak is convinced that Minister Kubat's difficulties stem from his anti-Slusovice activities because Prime Minister Pithart had had personal contacts with Slusovice at a time when together with the CSFR Deputy Prime Minister Pavel Rychetsky and the present Czech Republic Procurator General Ludvik Brunner they were employed by the Pokrok SBD [association for housing construction] which was closely connected with Slusovice. (Editors note: According to our information Petr Pithart was never employed by the Pokrok SBD) Another politician who according to Capt. Zak had contacts with Slusovice is Vaclav who according to Capt. Zak had contacts with Slusovice is Vaclav Vales, Deputy Prime Minister of the Federal Government. Zak is convinced that Vales was an StB agent and up to November 1989 had extensive personal contacts with the then commander of the 5th Administration of StB, the above-mentioned Vaclav Kilian.

We have succeeded in finding out that Capt. Zak did not take his vacation, was ordered to turn in his service weapon and remain in his place of residence. At the moment he is a tourist in Zurich where he has already sought information on obtaining political asylum. Based on charges filed by former Slusovice functionaries he is the subject of criminal prosecution in the CSFR for abuse of power by a public official and extortion. In no event will he reportedly agree to return to Czechoslovakia.

### 2 Central Banks Would Produce 2 Currencies

91CH0739A Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak  
12 Jul p 3

[Interview with Jozef Kucerak, chairman of Public Against Violence; place and date not given: "Two Central Banks?"]

[Text] [VEREJNOST] People are asking what these arguments about two central banks are all about. Does it matter if bank notes are printed in one or two places?

[Kucerak] Let us not confuse the concept of "printing bank notes" with "central bank." Officially, our bank notes can be printed anywhere, even abroad. I do not even know where they actually are printed. But to know that is not important—even in the event that I would want to steal a brand new bank note. Printing of bank notes is a technical matter. From the economic point of view, a central bank is important. A central bank decides how much money can be in circulation, the total sums of money that banks can grant as credit, whether money is to be cheap or expensive.

[VEREJNOST] Why does VPN [Public Against Violence] disagree with the establishment of a Slovak central bank?

[Kucerak] A characteristic feature of a common state is precisely a single central bank. That is the way it is also in our federation. When there is a single central bank, money costs the same in both republics and can therefore be used in both republics without any problems. If there were to be two central banks, it would very quickly happen that money would have one value in the Czech lands and another one in Slovakia. Naturally, it would be immediately necessary to distinguish the two of them with graphics so that it would not be confused—and two kinds of money would then be in existence in the CSFR. It would be immediately necessary to establish a rate of exchange between the Czech and the Slovak koruna, as is the case with any foreign currency. It would mean that our economy would be thus definitely divided.

[VEREJNOST] Is it really impossible to prevent this scenario? Could they, for example, come to an agreement on common procedures....?

[Kucerak] If they wanted to adopt the same approach, they would always have to negotiate an agreement on all matters. They would therefore have to establish a joint office—that is, a single central bank. They would be exactly where we are now. I must add that the current arrangement of the central bank is such that both republics are represented in it on an equal footing. In other words, what you are suggesting the law already guarantees.

[VEREJNOST] Nevertheless, I cannot imagine why it would have to end up by money having a different value in Slovakia than in the Czech lands?

[Kucerak] It would be enough if in one republic they put more money into circulation—the banks would then have to reduce the interest rate. Money would become cheaper. With lower interest rates, it would not pay citizens to put money in savings banks. They would begin to withdraw more of it and buy goods and services. Demand would increase, but supply would not be able to adjust quickly enough. Prices would increase. The purchasing power of the koruna would thus decline in one republic. It would become more advantageous for citizens and enterprises to buy only in one republic. In that way the inflationary money of one republic would be transferred to the other. And that one would eventually have to protect itself. For example, by controlling the

transfer of currency at the Moravian-Slovak border—and that would put us in a situation when money must be differentiated.

[VEREJNOST] You really do not see any advantage in having two central banks?

[Kucerak] The only "positive aspect" of two central banks can be seen in "boosting the national pride" and in giving a pretty good living to more officials whom we are paying out of our taxes. On the other hand, a single central bank strengthens the rights and powers of the citizen, makes certain that a Slovak citizen can freely use his earned money in the Czech lands and vice versa. For entrepreneurs, there is the increased possibility to get credits—they can decide whether to obtain credit from a bank in one or the other republic. Two central banks strengthen the power of the bureaucracy.

[VEREKMPST] But the position of the Slovak National Party [SNS] and several other parties and economists is that Slovakia should have its own central bank....

[Kucerak] The SNS is against a common state, and therefore it is obviously also against a single central bank. But today I would not even be surprised if somebody were pursuing the policy of an independent Slovak state and at the same time proclaiming the need for a single central bank. Why could he not say that, when there are also such movements, economists and politicians in Slovakia who proclaim that they are in favor of a common state, but at the same time want two central banks. And they are not representatives of some unimportant movements.

[VEREJNOST] In your opinion, why are they demanding their own central bank?

[Kucerak] You have to ask them. But I do not think that it is ignorance. I rather think that it is a deliberate policy that ostensibly agrees with the public opinion of the majority of citizens—a common state, but at the same time is preparing such an arrangement of the economic system that will necessarily bring about Slovak independence. They rely on the belief that the citizen is not knowledgeable enough to realize that a seemingly unimportant decision—to have one or two central banks—can be a decision leading to the break up of our common state. It is a dishonest, underhanded, cavalier policy toward the citizens. As if you played chess and your opponent moved his men under the table. To put it in a nutshell, this is a simple equation; two central banks equal an independent Slovakia. And the politicians and economists have the obligation to explain this equation to the citizens very clearly.

**Torgyan Blasts Government's Economic Policy***91CH0780A Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP  
in Hungarian 29 Jul 91 p 3*

[Article by Jozsef Ferling: "Smallholders Congress in November"]

[Text] Close to 3,000 people could hear Jozsef Torgyan's Smallholders Party [FKgP] program at Pecs on Saturday [27 July] evening. As he claimed, it was written while in hiding.

We want to be the party of property owners—small-size-property owners and medium-size property owners—Torgyan said, as he then went on to explain that the Smallholders Party would also create property owners out of workers.

The Smallholders Party was always the peasantry's party, and it continues to belong to the peasantry, but it will become a truly great party when peasants join workers to build up a new, prosperous and great Hungary with the help of the intelligentsia, he added.

Young people from Zengovarkony, dressed in local costumes, danced on the stage to the sound of music lead by Dr. Torgyan. A spontaneous applause roared as Torgyan walked to the podium and repeatedly whipped Bolshevism and the Antall cabinet, which in his view conducted a reform communist economic policy. Applause directed from the first row of seats continued as Torgyan transcended contradictions in his reasoning without as much as blinking an eye.

Torgyan said that for some reason it seemed as if the Smallholders Party was missing from the parliament, as if the multiparty democracy had bottomed out, and while the Smallholders were not given the coalition role they ought to play in preparing cabinet decisions (in his view the FKgP was entitled to hold 30 percent of the power), they were forced to represent their position at a grand rally.

A new economic Trianon is threatening Hungary, which will bring upon our unfortunate nation a greater catastrophe than the actual Trianon, the FKgP chairman said at the beginning of his speech. A situation in which our country is being sold out either to the East or the West is intolerable, even though at this point they are selling large Hungarian enterprises in exchange for colored beads before our eyes.

The Torgyan program described at the grand rally does not have as its intent to change the traditional profile of the FKgP. In the party leader's definition, the FKgP is a conservative, radical party which rests on the Christian order of values, and which finds its place within the present political spectrum on the right. It wants to achieve a real system change instead of the semblance of a system change.

The FKgP will hold its national congress on 17 November, Torgyan announced in Veszprem. He indicated that his party would organize indemnification committees.

**Pozsgay's Plans: 'We Think in Longer Term'***91CH0780E Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
29 Jul 91 p 5*

[Interview with Imre Pozsgay, member of the parliament and head of the National Democratic Alliance, by Katalin Kekesi on 25 July; place not given: "Strengthening Our National Self-Identity; Imre Pozsgay on the New Movement"—first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Text] We requested an interview from Imre Pozsgay following a Thursday press conference at which a volume introducing the National Democratic Alliance was presented.

[Kekesi] When you first appeared it seemed as if you were organizing a movement supportive of the coalition's national policies. Some regarded this new organization as part of the so often mentioned Antall-Pozsgay Pact, whose contents are so ambiguous.

[Pozsgay] Only a misunderstanding or incorrect recognition of the situation could have lead to such a conclusion. Today's confusion may have played a role in this. So many trends invoking a national character are in operation that when we appeared, they surmised that some secret alliance had been formed. I can assure your readers that such an alliance does not exist.

[Kekesi] And there hasn't been one either?

[Pozsgay] No, there has not. The way history slated this to be, at one time we prepared the system change in a good cooperative framework. Not on the basis of a pact, but in hopes of achieving common goals. Since then, life has presented tasks to Jozsef Antall which are different from the ones I must perform. The misunderstanding might have originated from the fact that we defined ourselves in our program, and not in the negative, by way of denying things.

[Kekesi] Use of the adjective "national" also might have given cause for drawing such conclusions. Particularly, at a time when an emphasis on the national character, moreover an excessive emphasis of this character has become a common phenomenon in public life.

[Pozsgay] Only those nations which gained strength in their characteristic self-identity are able to become truly European. Countries which did not reaffirm themselves and countries devoid of a live community spirit will serve only as the labor force reserves of the future Europe, and will not become factors in formulating a character. There are more fortunate countries which have successfully struggled for their self-identity and are members of the European Community today. We are



excluded from this community, and not to a small extent as a result of the involvement of these fortunate, well-to-do Westerners. Those who make constant reference to this idea will, undoubtedly, wear out this concept.

[Kekesi] Don't you feel a bit bitter about the most recent movements in the parliament? Everybody expected to see an increase in the number of independents, thus increasing Imre Pozsgay's chances of forming a party.

[Pozsgay] What we see here are more like initial motions, and within that, informational disturbances. I believe that the main line along which the parliament is to be reorganized leads through the independents.

[Kekesi] When changes began to occur people were apprehensive about your delayed action in removing the progressive forces of the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party], and in forming a new party. It now appears that you started out too early.

[Pozsgay] Concerning the earlier situation I would say that I did what was waiting for me, and what I could. It is not certain that I am responsible for what someone else should have done. History provided me with an opportunity that is not afforded to an entire generation in other times. I used this opportunity to the extent that my abilities permitted me to do so. I was unable to grasp what was outside of my abilities.

At this time, we are working perhaps in an appropriate time frame. We began persistent organization on the foundations. We do not intend to join the present political clamor, we want to work without loud manifestations. We think in the longer term, but in order to do so we must start on time. Ours is a movement which came about in due course.

[Kekesi] Individuals who make statements and part of the press treat your organization gratuitously. Aren't you hurt by these voices?

[Pozsgay] I was rather pleasantly surprised by the objective writings presented by a majority of the press. Some independent writings appeared despite their sympathies and antipathies. Gratuitous treatment is one form of expressing an opinion.

[Kekesi] It is indeed difficult to tell what is in the making. Is it a party, a movement...?

[Pozsgay] The National Democratic Alliance intends to reach a consensus regarding the unresolved matters of the system change. Therefore, while other parties and movements feel that they have arrived at a new system, we do not feel that way. National unity regarding fundamental issues continues to be missing. One cannot make decisions on the basis of partial interests and partial considerations regarding the new constitution, foreign policy, the building of international relations, the school system, and the future of national assets.

[Kekesi] It appears that only an objective constraint could lead to such a compromise. What would be that constraint?

[Pozsgay] The crisis which took this country captive.

[Kekesi] The cabinet, and mostly the prime minister, firmly deny the existence of a crisis.

[Pozsgay] This is a familiar gesture. Perhaps even their own interests dictate that they say so. I, on the other hand, recognize a crisis where others see only functional disturbances and structural problems, where they envision to perform administrative tasks only. This is the difference between us, and it is this difference we would like to convey through our program.

### Political Struggle Over School Principal

91CH0780B Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP  
in Hungarian 29 Jul 91 p 4

[Article by Ferenc Zsiga: "The Principal Remains in Place at Lakitelek"]

[Text] The matter of relieving elementary school principal Attila Dobo from his duties has preoccupied the residents of Lakitelek for about two months. Action to remove the principal started when school children and their parents began to distribute leaflets in the village. From its contents, local residents could learn who Attila Dobo really was, according to the anonymous author of the pamphlet.

The writing, which contained several factual errors, regarded as Dobo's greatest sins his conversion from being a member of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] to a member of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], and the fact that his dictatorial inclinations impeded school work that should have been devoid of politics. The parents' work association, which encouraged Dobo's relief, collected about 500 signatures in the village. The local chapter of the Educators' Union protested the manner in which the signature drive was conducted as well as the contents of the appeal and condemned the action taken by the parents' work association. The principal was confirmed in his office by a vote of 18:3 at a board of education meeting held on 23 May.

Recognizing the signatures of the 508 Lakitelek residents, the autonomous local government initiated an investigation into the matter and appointed a separate fact finding committee. At last week's local government meeting the chairman of the committee submitted a proposal to the body which holds authority over personal matters, calling for the dismissal of Dobo from his position as principal for reasons of human conduct indicative of incompatibility and of being unfit. A large number of villagers gathered in front of the village hall on the day of the meeting to finally learn the results of the decision reached by the village government.

Mayor Balazs Anka was assigned the role of making the announcement. He first reported the recommendation made by the committee, then the results of the vote. Passions broke loose when he uttered the final word: The governmental body confirmed Attila Dobo in his position as principal by a 7:5 vote ratio.

An eye witness from Lakitelek who did not dare to identify himself claimed that the announcement was followed by a great uproar. Those gathered demanded that the mayor name each member of the body and state the way they voted. Once this took place it turned out that the seven MDF local government representatives voted in support of the principal, while the mayor himself was against him. The crowd began to demand that the seven MDF members inform the people of the reason for their votes, but this did not come about. The representatives felt that the situation was too hot to handle and hurriedly left through the back door.

In talking to local residents one cannot tell for the time being whether the majority of village residents desire to see a change in the school principal's position. Several people claimed that the governmental body was sharply divided and that personal interests, party affiliations, and personal relations counted. Some individuals expressed concern about the principal's physical safety when they said that the MDF wanted to show that it was the decisive factor in the village. The case will most certainly continue in court, even though the local government intends to convene the residents for a village meeting.

Although one has to wait for the final word in this regard, it is certain that the case already has its losers: the children, the teachers, and the parents.

#### **Election Laws, House Rules Discussed, Debated**

*91CH0780C Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP  
in Hungarian 29 Jul 91 p 5*

[Article by Janos L. Laszlo: "Unsettled Party Structure Would Render Representatives Stationary"]

[Text] The first time a parliamentary representative left his own party faction and joined the independents by changing seats, everyone suddenly recognized that this process was not governed by law. Since then, half a dozen representatives have abandoned their respective parties. Some were even more alarmed by Emese Ugrin's action when she moved from the Christian Democrats not to the independents, but to the Smallholders. Thus, the obvious is taking place: In the near future parties will claim that this matter needs to be tied to rules so as to constrain the unlimited opportunity of moving around now available to representatives.

The new House Rules have been completed months ago and the above mentioned events are likely to hasten the day when they are placed on the agenda. Perhaps by no coincidence, not too long ago the Free Democrats initiated action to make the internal rules of their own

faction more stringent. Although the new House Rules and increased faction discipline would make it more difficult for representatives to move around, a real change could be accomplished only by changing the law.

The greatest concern in this regard is presented by the fact that representatives, elected because their names were included in party slates, received their mandates on the basis of votes cast for parties and party programs, and thus, their support of a different political force would hardly be acceptable. On the other hand, the degree of freedom a representative enjoys in regard to his mandate and to whom he is accountable in the event that he changes his party belonging is governed by the election law and not by the House Rules.

The present House Rules were written for the single-party parliament of 1985 and were amended thereafter. They have very little to say about groups of representatives. All they say is that parties entitled to be represented in the National Assembly as well as representatives not belonging to parties may form permanent groups (factions) in order to streamline their activities in the National Assembly. At least 10 representatives are needed to establish a permanent group of representatives.

The proposed new House Rules include a recommendation by which representatives registered with the same party may form only a single group of representatives and that each representative may be a member of only one grouping. In contrast, however, the proposal would permit representatives to leave their own group of representatives and to join another. Quite naturally, representatives may offer further amendments to the proposed House Rules. Paragraph 24 Section 4 of the Constitution mandates that the House Rules be adopted by the vote of a two-thirds majority.

There are obvious reasons for leaving the House Rules untouched at the moment. Many believe that the present party structure cannot be regarded as settled and final, and the ability of representatives to move around may be helpful in completing the necessary rearrangements.

To our knowledge, the National Elections Office has not yet received a request to prepare possible amendments to the election law. This, however, does not rule out the possibility that such amendments are being considered in certain party or government circles.

According to Law No. 34 of 1989 concerning the election of National Assembly representatives, the rights and duties of representatives elected by different methods are identical. The law does not include provisions for the recall of representatives, nor does it include a provision which would tie mandates to parties. Equally, Law No. 55 of 1990 concerning the legal status of representatives does not include provisions that would restrict the movement of representatives between parties and factions.

Both laws must be adopted by the vote of two-thirds majorities, accordingly, the amending of these laws would require a full consensus among the parties.

A conference to be held in Budapest early this week may provide ideas for the resolution of the problems that presented themselves. The conference is called the "Symposium of Central European Electoral Systems" and was organized jointly by the American International Foundation for Electoral Systems and the Interior Ministry's Election Office. The various electoral systems will be presented in the form of case histories by experts arriving from a dozen countries.

**Rumors, Controversy Surround Radio Free Europe**  
*91CH0780D Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 29 Jul 91 p 5*

[Article by Csaba Konczol: "Radio Free Europe Awaits Frequency"]

[Text] We were informed that an internal investigation has been launched at the Munich headquarters of Radio Free Europe [RFE] to find out how the Hungarian press learned about the fact that RFE and Hungarian Government official met at RFE's Munich headquarters on 22 July to discuss ways in which RFE could begin broadcasting within Hungary as soon as possible—within days—on a nationwide UHF frequency, despite the prevailing frequency moratorium. The MAGYAR HIRADO program dealt with this matter in detail on Friday evening.

We should add here that we were informed that Vladimir Kusin, the Czechoslovak deputy chief of RFE's "Research Center" at the headquarters location, was recently fired. The reason for letting Kusin go: Officials of the Czech and Slovak Republic submitted official secret documents to RFE which clearly showed that Kusin has long been an agent of the former communist secret services at the radio.

In the framework of the MAGYAR HIRADO broadcast, Mihaly Hamburger announced that the Hungarian press had learned about the planned new frequency allocation from a telephone caller who remained unknown.

"I do not intend to comment on the morals of the caller. Parenthetically, the salaries here are quite good. It would be more honorable from the standpoint of persons who disagreed with the radio's policies if they picked up their hats and left, instead of making anonymous phone calls," Hamburger declared.

The commentator argued with Miklos Haraszti who announced that the UHF band was not the entailed property of the government. On the other hand, the meaning of this report is that the "government itself is establishing a radio station. RFE has been in existence for decades. It was established by the American Government out of American taxpayers' money, and not by the Hungarian Government. Accordingly, the Hungarian

Government is not establishing a radio station, at best it provides improved broadcasting opportunities for RFE. It does so not without charge, and not even in exchange for the radio's support of the cabinet, but consistent with the rules of a market economy, for money, for foreign exchange," the commentator said. During the 1980's RFE supported primarily the opposition. This was based on a political decision. It amounted to making an exception which was opposed by some even within RFE. Miklos Haraszti and his associates became known in the country because RFE made them popular and this was reflected even in the election results. "At that time he did not object to making an exception. He does now; and he even wants his objection to be understood. He wants us to understand his assumption that we sold our souls, perhaps our word, in exchange for a wave length."

"The opposition is making a just demand for the enactment of a media law at the earliest possible date," Hamburger said during the program. "But you should understand, we would like to broadcast as soon as possible under conditions which ensure good reception."

RFE's Hungarian division chief, Laszlo Ribanszky, explained in an interview that negotiations in the literal sense of that term concerning a new UHF frequency have not taken place thus far. In an official letter to the appropriate ministry, RFE inquired more than a year ago about ways in which RFE could be authorized to broadcast in Hungary. The response stated that due to the prevailing frequency moratorium it was unfortunately impossible to do so. Once this matter appeared to have come to a rest, RFE once again turned to the ministry and to the media committee of the National Assembly. The response was the same, nothing could be done until a new media law was enacted and until the frequency moratorium was lifted.

"I am not sufficiently familiar with domestic politics to be able to provide a responsible answer to this question (an exceptional broadcasting license prior to lifting the frequency moratorium? Cs. K.), but my instincts tell me that as long as they were able to find a solution in Czechoslovakia and Poland, Hungary certainly could also find a solution like this," Ribanszky said.

**Soviet Account Settlement Plan Incomprehensible**  
*91CH0799A Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 18 Jul 91 p 9*

[Article by H.L.: "Incomprehensible Soviet Position: Commercial and Military Account Settlements Cannot Be Combined"]

[Text] Yesterday, we reported that according to an official of the Soviet Ministry of the External Economy, the Soviet Union intends to link its indebtedness, which stems from commercial trade transactions, to the account settlements that follows the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Moreover, Nikolai Dubenskij's statement

to our Moscow reporter sounded as if this concept had been an accomplished fact, one to which the Hungarian party has already agreed.

We asked Istvan Tamas, a deputy division chief at the Ministry of International Economic Relations, how our Hungarian experts view the Soviet position. "Frankly, we were surprised by this announcement," Tamas replied. "Although this Soviet concept has been discussed, nothing specific has been said about it in negotiations thus far. This 'solution' is fully unacceptable from our standpoint because two entirely different kinds of settlements are involved. With respect to Soviet commercial debts we have accurate records about amounts owed to the various businesses, while the same has not been clarified relative to the withdrawal of troops. We negotiate continuously to settle the commercial debts, and although there is no signed agreement, we have agreed in principle that the accumulated Soviet deficit would be paid off in installments over a period of three years. Just when this will begin and what interest they will pay remains questionable for the time being.

"On the other hand, no question exists concerning the fact that the settlement of the trade balance is a matter between the enterprises and financial institutions, while the financial settlement related to the withdrawal of troops is a transaction between the two states. We cannot comprehend how the two kinds of account settlements could be combined, how a common balance could be established," Tamas said.

#### **Finance Minister Kupa on Various Issues**

*91CH0798A Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP  
in Hungarian 11 Jul 91 p 9*

[Article by Melinda Kamasz and Ilona Kocsi: "Mihaly Kupa on the First Semester and Privatization"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Responding to a question, the minister said that indemnification would increase the state's indebtedness by about 140 billion forints. The excess supply of indemnification vouchers will depress their price at the exchange, thus it will fuel inflation and may pump excess consumption into the economy. Regardless of this, it would be beneficial to have an indemnification law that is acceptable to everyone, the minister said.

One cannot expect banks in the present commercial banking system to function as investment, capital investment financing, and as mortgage banks. Establishing such banks, however, would satisfy fundamental interests.

Speaking of privatization Kupa stressed that a compromise must be reached in this regard not between he and Csepi, but by the political parties and by managers and employees, even though privatization will always hurt the interests of someone, regardless of the kind of privatization. An increasing role is assigned in this regard to enterprise management.

At present, the dispute centers on who should manage parts of businesses which remain under state ownership.

The AVU [State Property Agency] is not a property management organization, therefore, the management of property is likely to be transferred to holding corporations. Another dispute exists in regard to the management of stock owned by the state. And yet another problem is presented by the fact that systems designed to encourage privatization do not function, Kupa concluded.

A surprisingly optimistic Kupa held a press conference Tuesday evening aboard the steam ship Kossuth. Only the heat was capable of making Kupa sweat, not the journalists. He claimed that he had excellent relations with several of his fellow ministers, and as he said, he got along well with the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] faction in the parliament and with the Christian Democrats. The only time his voice may have toughened was when he was carried away by his apparently usual passion saying that the government had an agreed upon economic policy which was mandatory with respect to every member of the cabinet. One may exercise criticism, but one cannot fail to implement it. Kupa felt that in his own peculiar way Jozsef Antall supported him, i.e., even though the questions raised by journalists revealed some doubt about this, Kupa said that he enjoyed the prime minister's confidence. This is proven by the fact that from a practical standpoint the cabinet accepted all of the economic legislative proposals. The parliament was responsible for not making these proposals a reality.

The fact that Kupa has served as finance minister for half a year might have been the apropos for the news conference. For this reason, Kupa felt that it would be worthwhile to draw a balance sheet of his own functioning. In addition, attorney Laszlo Sardi introduced himself. He will manage Kupa's parliamentary campaign. Sardi said that he agreed to become the campaign chief for Kupa as a private person, and not for Kupa the finance minister. Confusing the two roles would not be beneficial.

At the time Kupa took charge of the Finance Ministry there was no accepted budget, economic management was scattered, and international confidence was waning. Under these circumstances, Kupa felt that his most important task was to restore self-confidence by describing the difficulties, but doing so in good spirits and with much optimism and search for support. The finance minister would be in great need of support, because he was not a member of any party. Kupa agreed to become a candidate for representative to fill the missing political background, because in a coalition cabinet the situation of a minister recognized "only" as an expert was more difficult. This undertaking had its own risks, of course....

Presently, Kupa feels that Hungary could become a success country, a model for success, and the the possibility of playing the role of a bridge between the East and



the West still existed. The projections contained in the Kupa program adopted as the cabinet's program became a reality with two exceptions: The new tax policy concept has not yet been presented to the parliament, and a social welfare program that would enhance the realization of economic policy concepts is still missing. Nevertheless, it was possible to keep the economy within the projected limits, which raises hopes that the program becomes a reality, even though it does not hold out the promise of prosperity. Subsequently, the finance minister stated that the 7-billion-forint budget reserve has been exhausted and that the situation of inflation depended on their ability to hold down expenditures. For the time being, revenues fell far short of planned levels. Kupa reiterated that there would be no forint devaluation because nothing would warrant such action.

With respect to the information confusion Kupa said that foreigners might not take Hungary seriously if everyone provided different figures, often confusing positive figures with negative figures concerning the same subject. A reliable statistical system cannot be established overnight, but experts should compare their figures before publishing them. Even this would be an improvement over the confusion of data that exists.

#### **Finance Ministry Official on 1992 Budget**

*91CH0798C Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP  
in Hungarian 12 Jul 91 p 8*

[Article by Melinda Kocsis: "Termination of Several Funds Planned; From a Certain Point of View, Next Year's Budget Will Be in a Worse Situation Than This Year's"]

[Text] In many respects, the 1992 budget starts out from a worse position than this year's budget. In the framework of the country's three year program, which has been adopted by both the parliament and the cabinet, a far smaller, tens of billions of forints lower, budget deficit has been projected than this year's 78 billion forint shortfall. Accordingly, expenditures must be reduced even more. This will affect the segregated funds, among other matters. The Finance Ministry plans to terminate several of these funds next year. We discussed this subject with Finance Ministry Deputy State Secretary Gyorgy Naszvadi.

Segregated funds are established to provide for separate, special functions. At present, some 30 funds "live their own lives" in Hungary, but their number peaked during the early 1980's when there were about 60. From the Finance Ministry's viewpoint, a country of this size facing heavy budget cuts does not need this many segregated funds. A significant number of these are supported solely by the state budget, the other half also has other revenues sources. In the ministry's view, very many funds carry on their independent activities regardless of the fact that budgeted funds also exist for government programs having the same purpose. For example, most research is funded directly by the budget. The same

applies to agriculture. Yet these programs are also pursued under separate funds. Still, the Finance Ministry believes that there are many superfluous funds. For this reason, the ministry plans to fully terminate a few of the funds, while the rest are slated for big funding cuts and their tasks will be reconsidered.

The legislative proposal on the state household budget provides that segregated funds can be established only by law. Once the parliament adopts this legislative proposal, preparations for controlling these funds must begin, and alternatively, the funds must be terminated. (Previously, funds could be established on the basis of council of ministers decrees and even as a result of lower level legal provisions.) The proposal establishes 1 January 1993 as the deadline for preparing rules of this nature for the various funds. Before then, however, a decision must be made as to which funds are needed, and which ones are superfluous. (At present, not even half of the 30 funds are governed by law.) The state household budget law also states that funds solely supported by the state budget must not operate even if they are governed by law. Some other resources must be attracted if there is a need for a fund, otherwise the operation of the fund is deemed superfluous.

The idea of operating the funds in a form other than segregated funds has also occurred, according to Naszvadi. For example, at present, debate centers around the foreign tourism fund. Thus far, this fund received most of its support in the form of large budgetary subsidies. We inherited this from the days when all activities related to foreign tourism were regarded as state functions. Today, the state's role in foreign tourism must also be decreased, an increasingly larger number of things can be done in the form of enterprising. The only matter that may be regarded as a state function is national advertising. In the opinion of the Finance Ministry, one cannot regard as national advertising the fact that many foreign tourism firms use this money to advertise themselves. On the other hand, it is not certain whether a separate fund has to be operated for the purpose of national advertising, Naszvadi said. It could be that it would be more appropriate to include this money in the appropriate chapter of the budget—an amount the country was able to pay for purposes of such advertising.

Even in regard to funds provided for by law one must check on the timeliness of the rules. The specialized training fund for example, was established at a time when state enterprises which spent money for this purpose were predominant. It is not at all certain that the financing of even the technical development program is beneficial, particularly if we consider the research activity as a whole. The higher education and the OTKA [National Scientific Research Fund] funds as well as the commercial development fund must also be examined. The latter was based on commercial policies. The Finance Ministry recommends a tightening of all of these.

The ministry wants to terminate the forest maintenance, land preservation, fishing development, wild life management, and the general market intervention funds. It has become entirely clear in regard to these that an unnecessary distribution of money and the performance of superfluous functions has been taking place.

There are countless overlaps between these funds in addition to the already mentioned problems. For example, the commercial development, foreign tourism and the general market intervention funds serve similar purposes in many respects and yet they operate separately. But the situation is the same in regard to research, this too could be financed in a more concentrated fashion, according to the Finance Ministry. Although undoubtedly a countless number of worthy people work at research institutes, there also are some superfluous people there. As a result of our isolation from the West we financed several projects, which by now could be simply purchased from the West. Maintaining and oversized structure is unwarranted.

The various ministries have already received the position statement and the proposal. As one could expect, the ministries were not in full agreement in regard to these. The Finance Ministry requested the various ministries to submit their comments by 20 July 1991 and state what kind of proposal they would regard as a starting point with respect to the funds under their respective jurisdictions. Debate starts thereafter. But the deadline is rather tight; the 1992 budget report must be submitted to the parliament by 31 August.

The ministries must also consider the fact that in a certain respect next years budget will be in a worse situation than this year's budget is. A substantially smaller budget deficit has been projected in the country's three year program. Thus it will not suffice to merely adjust expenditures to revenues, expenditures must also be cut back. This cutback represents several tens of billions of forints, and although they are counting on expanded economic performance next year, this is not likely to increase revenues all of a sudden. There is no other solution than to strongly cut back on expenditures, including on support for segregated funds, Naszvadi said.

#### **AVU Role in YBL Bank Stock Sale Explained**

*91CH0798B Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP  
in Hungarian 11 Jul 91 p 9*

[Article by N.T.K.: "The State Sold It at the Lowest Price; Was the YBL Bank Stock Registered or Redeemable on Sight?"]

[Text] As this newspaper reported a few days ago, more than half of the YBL Bank's stock was purchased by private entrepreneurs. This transaction caused no small disturbance in Hungarian financial circles, because no one counted on this to happen. And, it appears, there are problems with this transaction.

Almost half of the stock that amounted to a total of 600 million forints at nominal value was sold by the State Property Agency [AVU]. Compared to the present price of the stock quoted by the bank, this exchange rate appeared reasonable because in the average the new stockholders acquired YBL Bank stock for a price close to the nominal value. As it has since turned out, the state is not at all certain whether it struck such a good deal. This is because the stock worth 300 million forints at nominal value managed by the AVU was sold at 94 percent of the nominal value. In addition, certain published reports claimed that a significant foreign demand existed for YBL Bank stock, because YBL Bank was one of the best small banks. These foreign investors would have been willing to pay a price high above the nominal value of the stock. We asked Laszlo Bathory, who took part in the transaction on behalf of the AVU, how, based on all this, could justify that the AVU agreed to the deal under these conditions?

Bathory responded that the AVU acted in a manner consistent with rules. After an approach was made to the AVU with an intent to buy the stock, the AVU requested two offers, in addition to a brokerage which expressed interest. These offers were lower, however, than the original offer. Aware of this, the AVU board decided to request additional offers. The second round of offers was not more successful either. Accordingly, they were presented with two choices: either to accept the original offer or not to sell the stock. "One could have waited, and waiting could have been better. But I am not certain whether we could have reached a better deal within a few months or even within a year," the AVU official noted.

Based on what he said, the fact that the AVU had been in touch with brokerage firms also came to light. They were unaware of the ultimate buyer. On the other hand, no one informed the AVU of the fact that foreign buyers expressed an interest in the bank. Thus, they were not able to consider this fact at the time the deal was struck.

Yet another problem arises in regard to the YBL Bank stock sold by the AVU. Reports have it that the AVU did not endorse the stock it sold, and that it was unclear whether the AVU held registered stock or stock that could be redeemed on sight. (This issue is of interest because if registered stock had been involved, the new owners would always be entered into the register of stocks. This is the condition which enables a stockholder to enforce his ownership rights, such as voting at the stockholders' meeting or to collect dividends. But entering a stockholder's name is possible only if the stock is endorsed, i.e., if the former owner verifies the sale on the reverse side of the stock with his signature. Such endorsement is not required with respect to stock redeemable on sight.)

In this regard Bathory said that in a physical sense the stock was never in the possession of the AVU. The stock was deposited at the Central Corporation of Banking Companies. Regardless of this fact, the AVU would have endorsed the stock had it not been for the fact that they

were notified of a decision reached at the YBL Bank's general meeting only after the sale was consummated. The decision called for changing the stock thus far redeemable on sight for registered stock. Thus, the AVU had no opportunity to confirm the sale by endorsing the stock.

With the consummation of a sales agreement the AVU regards this as a closed case. As a result, there exists an opportunity for registration in the stock registry, but this is the business of the bank.

### Wisdom of Nuclear Energy Reliance Disputed

91CH0798D Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
17 Jul 91 p 9

[Article by Tamas Fleischer: "Nuclear Business—A Tremendous Business?"]

[Text] The 3 July 1991 issue of NEPSZABADSAG published a lengthy interview with the international director of the French Electrical Works (EDF) ("Nuclear Business on the Horizon"). Since this organization has been trying to strongly influence both the Hungarian decisionmakers and the Hungarian public as of late, it might not be superfluous to describe how the "nuclear business" should be viewed from the Hungarian side—the potential buyer's side.

In recent decades France has experienced two shocks which decisively determined that country's chosen energy policy in the long term.

The first shock evolved by the early 1960's when Algeria became independent and France lost its "domestic" oil and gas supplies as a result. The other shock was caused by the 1973 oil price explosion. By then France's energy dependence has increased significantly. Several nuclear power plants had already been built, but as of 1973, the country satisfied only 25 percent of its total energy consumption from domestic sources. (The same ratio was 50 percent in 1965. Now France's domestic energy supply ratio has once again reached 50 percent. The ratio in Hungary is 40 percent.) Everybody was talking about an energy shortage. This provided an appropriate political atmosphere for having to do no more than to present finished plans for additional nuclear power plants.

By now, France produces 75 percent of its electrical energy in nuclear power plants. A ratio which comes close to this exists only in Belgium (60 percent), followed by Hungary's 50 percent, and South Korea's close to 50 percent. A great gap in the ranking follows thereafter. The global average is 17 percent. Even the United States, which has one out of every four nuclear power plants in the world barely exceeds the 20 percent ratio.

Should those at the top of the ranking be proud? I am afraid we will find ourselves in the same place where we were with the industrial statistics of the past decades. Those comparisons proudly showed the increase in steel or machine tool production in socialist countries, while

developed countries consciously scaled down these branches of industry. As the graph shows [no graph published] the number of new orders has steadily declined ever since 1976. This form of energy production has already peaked. In this phase, developed industrial countries, usually try to get rid of their industrial production equipment, sell the entire technology, factories, and development to countries in which they still can find buyers. But a nuclear plant is a more dangerous piece of production equipment than a car manufacturing plant or a textile mill, which may be placed anywhere in the third world without any concern. The descending slope of the life cycle of nuclear power plants is likely to be much shorter than the ascending slope was. We will suddenly notice that the developed world exerts moral pressure on the less developed regions of the world at first to discontinue the transportation of nuclear waste, and then to reduce production. The losers will be countries which in those days will still rely on energy produced by their nuclear plants. It could be that these countries will still be trying to pay off their investment loans by delivering energy produced in these plants at that time.

Those in doubt could say that all this is possible, but at this time we are the ones who experience trouble, and therefore, we would be benefit by purchasing nuclear energy production facilities. Is this really true? (Are the suggestions made by our politicians true, notably that we are now experiencing the same trouble France experienced at the time of the two shocks, and that the way out of that trouble is the same path chosen by France at the time?)

I agree with the idea that we must establish multibased import opportunities both in terms of materials which contain energy and of energy sources, and as a result of this, competitive Hungarian energy production must not be placed at a disadvantage either. But what we hear beyond this, i.e., the forced development of domestic energy production, serves a different purpose. The EDF director states in his interview that energy prices in France are lower than in other countries, thanks to the nuclear plants. (But he fails to add that along with "cheap" French energy production, the EDF's indebtedness today is twice the amount of the Hungarian state's gross indebtedness!)

If we were to maintain our energy prices low as a result of large state investments, we would once again entrap ourselves. The world has started out on a different path a long time ago, in these places the structure of the national economies, the consumption models and the declining levels of energy consumption have adapted to higher prices. If we wanted to remain competitive with our relatively lower priced energy in this world, we would attract precisely that kind of obsolete, energy intensive production, which would prolong or increase our backwardness. Suffice it to mention here that along with the almost identical per capita energy consumption throughout the East European economies, they are able to produce only half or one-third of the value market

economies can. One should find incentives to explore the reserves that may be found in liquidating the waste of energy, rather than to render counterinterests permanent!

Today, Hungary imports 60 percent of all the energy it consumes. Alleviating the one-sided dependence is indeed important, and this is consistent with the first mentioned principle in the Industry Ministry's latest energy policy. But the planned expansion of the Paks nuclear power plant would reduce this dependence (which rests on Soviet imports) only in the short term, in the long term it would exchange the present one-sided dependence to another one-sided dependence: Two-thirds of Hungarian electrical energy production would originate from a single nuclear source and from a single point within the country. In addition, constructing the nuclear power plant fully contradicts the other two basic principles of the above mentioned official concept: The plan does not serve the interests of energy conservation, and does not satisfy the principle of flexible development, which keeps in step with needs.

This goal remains a collection of empty words, if we commit ourselves to nuclear-based electrical energy production funded by the state, whose outcome is questionable from the standpoint of the environment and the future.

#### **Bankrupt Enterprises, Proceedings Analyzed**

91CH0798E Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP  
in Hungarian 18 Jul 91 p 9

[Article by H.L.: "Why Are Those Compelled To Lend Patient? The Bankruptcy Dominos Begin To Fall..."]

[Text] During the first half of the year bankruptcy proceedings were initiated in Budapest against 528 enterprises, roughly 100 fewer than during the entire last year. What is behind this alarming trend, what lessons can be learned, what conclusions can be drawn? In responding to these questions we used analyses prepared by Dr. Sandor Piskolti, the deputy president of the Capital City Court and head of the economic college.

As a matter of introduction the fact that we are discussing only data originating from the capital requires some explanation. Last year between 60 and 65 percent of the liquidation proceedings were initiated at the Capital City Court. This ratio appropriately reflects the industrial, commercial, and transportation center character of Budapest. The rest of the bankruptcy proceedings were conducted by the 19 county courts, they recorded the data locally. It is likely that the main ratios are not different on a national scale either, they differ at most because of the different weight of agriculture and industry in given places.

Of the 528 liquidation proceedings initiated during the first six months of this year at the Capital City Court, 117 cases were filed by the affected enterprises themselves. Of the 117 enterprises, 55 firms turned to the

court for reasons of insolvency, while the rest requested so-called simplified liquidation proceedings against themselves. Initiation of the latter type of proceeding should be understood to mean that the firm expects to be able to pay its creditors, while it does not envision further successful business operations and therefore it requests liquidation.

A decisive majority of the liquidation proceedings are sought by creditors. Of the 406 proceedings, eight were initiated by banks, five by the Social Security Directorate, 37 by the APEH [tax authority], and the rest by partner firms. This data is particularly surprising if we examine it in light of economic developments in recent months. We could probably understand the banks because they have a short-term interest in sustaining their financial connections, and in charging interest and premiums after loans—all this could not be accomplished once they initiated a liquidation proceedings. Moreover, in the framework of bankruptcy proceedings banks occupy the fifth place among those to be paid off and thus have little chance of recovering their outstanding loans. Aside from all this, however, this issue may also be viewed from another vantage point. Due to their cumulative effect, would not the placement of short-term interests above long-term interest amount to a postponement of resolving problems, to the evolution of a situation which might have rather grave, perhaps catastrophic consequences?

The "patience" manifested by the Social Security Directorate is even less comprehensible, because in their case no short term interest warrants the low number of bankruptcy initiatives. This is particularly true if we consider the fact that thus far in 1991, enterprises and entrepreneurs have remained indebted to the Directorate with Social Security contributions amounting to 28 billion forints, thus seriously endangering the already unstable situation of the social security budget.

As indicated, the tax authority is the one which shows most "manliness." Instead of the 27 bankruptcy proceedings the APEH initiated in the course of the entire year 1990, during the first six months this year it already has initiated 37 proceedings. This figure may also be regarded as small in light of the magnitude of back taxes owed, of course.

Equally surprising is the fact that at least according to available data, the Customs and Revenue Service experiences no problems with collecting customs duties from enterprises. They have not initiated a single proceeding. Considering the \$1 billion (!) import surplus of the first six months, most of which consists of luxury consumer goods on top, it would be hard to believe that everyone paid the customs duties he was supposed to and which in certain instances could amount to quite a lot. Payment of these amounts could push certain industries to the brink of insolvency.

Contrary to the state administrative organs, enterprises intending to collect their outstanding receivables are less understanding. They initiated proceedings against 356 firms.

It is also worth examining the first six months' data from the standpoint of the type of ownership forms under which the bankrupt enterprises are managed. Of the 529 firms, 116 are state enterprises and 217 are small cooperatives. Four agricultural producer cooperatives, one state farm, five joint enterprises, nine limited partnerships, and seven GMK's [economic work collectives] complement this assortment. As compared to 13 stock corporations last year, proceedings have been initiated against 28 stock corporations this year, but indications are that this will also be a dark year for limited liability corporations. Ninety-two bankruptcy proceedings were

initiated against such corporations last year, while this year's figure has already reached 139.

Data pertaining to the first six months already shows that month after month the number of insolvent firms increases. Thus it could easily happen that by the end of the year records will show not only twice the number of last year's 528 bankruptcy proceedings, but a far greater number.

The fact that the personal and technical capacity of the Capital City Court staff involved in economic suits and liquidations is unable to cope with the growing multitude of cases causes grave concern because it does make a difference to business organizations whether they are able to enforce their just demands only three or five years hence, particularly at a time when the inflation rate is so high.



**Democratic Union's Draft Antiabortion Law Examined***91EP0625A Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish  
16 Jul 91 p 3*

[Article by (aj): "New Draft of Antiabortion Law"]

[Text] The draft of a law that would repeal the 1956 Law on the Permissible Conditions for Terminating Pregnancy has been submitted by a group of deputies from the Parliamentary Club of the Democratic Union [KPUD].

They obliged themselves on 17 May to prepare this law when the Sejm, upon the proposal of the KPUD, decided not to review, for the time being, the draft of a Senate bill on the legal rights of the unborn child. The Senate bill stipulates that abortion would be banned with the exception of cases where the mother's life would be in danger.

According to the KPUD proposed law, abortion would be a crime against life. However, exceptions would be considered that were not contained in the Senate bill. According to the KPUD deputies, abortion should be allowed when:

- The mother's life or health is directly threatened (two physicians would have to confirm this).
- The pregnancy is the result of rape or incest. (This would be determined by the public prosecutor.)
- The woman finds herself in particularly difficult circumstances (to be determined by commissions whose makeup would be established by the minister of health).

In such cases, the draft planners want abortion to be performed only in public health service centers and not in private physicians' offices.

A penalty of up to three years in prison would be imposed for the "killing of a fetus" (such is the terminology used by the draft planners) with the consent of the mother or for assisting her in this. If the woman were to die as a result of an abortion or if she were to be maimed—up to five years in prison.

If the person performing the abortion were not a physician or if the pregnancy were more advanced than in its 12th week, the perpetrator could receive up to five years (and if the woman were to die or be injured—up to 10 years.)

For causing a miscarriage without the woman's consent or for forcing her to have an abortion by illegal threats or deceit, the penalty would be a six-month to eight-year prison term.

However, a woman who would perform an abortion on herself or would persuade someone else to do it would not be punished.

The unintentional causing of the death of a fetus in a mother's womb (e.g., if someone were to push a pregnant woman, causing a miscarriage), would be punishable

with imprisonment or the restriction of freedom for up to a year or a fine. A physician who harmed a child by giving it or its mother medical treatment would not be subject to punishment.

Medical and research experiments on the human fetus would be prohibited.

The law would go into effect six months after its passing.

The basis for the "penal" section of the draft law is the minister of justice's proposal of 13 June. On 17 May, the Sejm obligated him with a resolution to present changes in the Penal Code so that the Law dated 1956 on the Permissible Conditions for Terminating Pregnancy could be repealed.

"The legal-penal protection in and of itself will not prevent the destruction of conceived life. However, it can help rebuild the conviction in society that conceived life requires protection," claim KPUD deputies in justifying the bill.

The Sejm presidium will decide whether the first reading of the KPUD draft law will take place at the plenary session of the Sejm or in a committee. However, this does not have to be the Extraordinary Committee that had worked on the Senate draft because it was called together to review only that draft.

**Recent Poll Reveals Apathetic Electorate***91EP0640A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish  
22 Jul 91 pp 1-2*

[Article by Jaroslaw Najdowski: "Elections Without Voters"]

[Text] A 12-14 July preelection CBOS [Public Opinion Survey Center] poll based on a 1,000-person representative sample of the adult population of Poland is the first to be taken following the passage of the new electoral law. Before it took place we witnessed sharp disputes about the final shape of the electoral law. During that time also the Polish Peasant Party experienced a schism, which resulted in the formation of a new party by Roman Bartoszcze, the Polish Peasant Christian Forum "Ojcowizna" [Patrimony]. While the study was under way the alliance of peasant parties broke apart. On the other hand, the Center Accord party worked, together with Citizens Committees, to create a new electoral coalition.

Most of the political conflicts of last month took place in a far from civilized atmosphere. This has of a certainty affected the results of the poll.

Above all, the percentage of those interested in the elections dropped to just more than 45 percent. The predicted voter turnout will be at the level of 37 percent (compared with the 50 percent anticipated as recently as last April). This must be interpreted as a serious warning, even if the figures are considered somewhat underestimated because the poll was taken during the vacation

season when somewhat fewer active—and therefore more frequently voting—respondents were available.

The disputes about the electoral law benefited no party. The Democratic Union recorded a 5-percent decline in its base of support, while still leading the preelection marathon. As for the electorate of Center Accord, its size has remained practically the same. Just about the only beneficiaries of the disputes were the postcommunist forces: the OPZZ [All-Polish Trade Union Agreement], the SdRP [Social Democracy of the Polish Republic], and Party X. To be sure, the SdRP was involved in the disputes, but its representatives were not as active in propagandizing their point of view as the members of the Democratic Union and Center Accord.

Major changes on the political scene were caused by the breakup of the Polish Peasant Party and the peasant coalition. As a result, the Polish Peasant Party lost its standing as the strongest peasant party and joined the smaller, less important parties. This may be, of course, just temporary, particularly if W. Pawlak succeeds in impressing on the broader public the image of a fit successor of R. Bartoszcze. For the present, however, R.

Bartoszcze's new party can reckon on somewhat greater support than the Polish Peasant Party. In the balance, both these parties together have gained fewer votes than the Polish Peasant Party alone in a previous poll. Thus, Rural Solidarity now remains the only significant political force in the countryside. Compared with a previous poll, it has doubled its influence.

The results of not just this but also previous polls demonstrate that the parties benefiting most are those which propagandawise remain disengaged from the most vociferous political disputes or take a compromise position on these disputes. This happened with the Democratic Union last May (the dispute about the antiabortion law) and Solidarity in June (the effective negotiations with the government without excessive hulloaloo), and this is now happening with the OPZZ, the SdRP, Party X, and Rural Solidarity. It may be that moderation and compromise are the shortest road to electoral success. It may be that this also is a way of augmenting voter turnout. Any further decline in the voter turnout would practically threaten making a laughing stock of democracy in Poland.

**ROMANIA MARE Attitudes Deplored**

91BA0961B Bucharest ROMANIA LITERARA  
in Romanian 25 Jul 91 p 3

[Article by Mircea Mihaies: "Caliban and the Sergeants"]

[Text] For years we fed on the fairy tale that ours was a great culture ignored by the venal West. The postrevolutionary reality, however, has shown us two things. On the one hand, that we are not ignored by the world, and on the other, that we are not a great culture. In the past year the West has talked more about Romania than in our entire multimillenary history. It has talked about Romania's endless political scandal and about Vlachian neocommunist, but not a word about Romanian culture. It is of course difficult to assume that the inferior products of people like E. Barbu and A. Paunescu, the writers most fashionable at the time of the 1989 event could, whitewash the shame of our culture. But we do have an alternative for our consolation: In our turn and with patriotic elan, we can despise everything that has to do with Western culture. The savage anti-Western sentiment of many of the Romanian neoproletarian cult makers has its origin in profound personal frustration. Draped in the folds of a hollow nationalism, these wordmongers continue to find the grapes too sour. They take unanimously accepted standards as a personal insult and ferociously defend their posture as moral guardians of the Romanian people as their own privilege. Pathological xenophobia, nauseating anti-Semitism, and the exaltation of their own impotence is the only reason for living and writing of these sergeants disguised as national patriots.

In these conditions, the question of how far can a culture like ours afford to sabotage itself becomes a Hamletian dilemma. What curse impels us to smear the very few Romanian writers currently known beyond our borders? For how many Romanian authors are Western publishers now fighting, the way they are fighting for Czech, Yugoslav, or Hungarian writers? How long will the mentality of petty cadre bosses continue to be all powerful along the shores of the Dimbovita? The answer cannot be provided on the spot. It has to do with something other than the literature itself, it has to do with the unfathomable depths of the cracked awareness of some seventh grade scriveners, the self-proclaimed national geniuses....

A Mafia mentality sees Mafias everywhere. Only too well aware of how they climbed into their top cultural seats, the cadres file gamblers are operating a transfer of intentions. If they are scoundrels, everyone else must be a scoundrel. The unrestrained campaigns of the publication insolently called ROMANIA MARE exceed in villainy anything that a murderous propaganda shoved down our throats for half a century. The fascist crimes of the 1930's and the communist crimes of the 1950's have found their publicistic equal in the ROMANIA MARE of the 1990's. Of course, the day will come when Messrs.

Vadim, Barbu, and others will leave aside the cursing and go on to actions. The gendarme's club and the anti-Semites' gun will replace the slobbery invective and the disgusting denunciation.

Previously, E. Barbu used to work with scum. Now he has become a part of the scum of the notorious institution whose pulp literature he transcribes with pathological dilligence. A horrible melange of lies, slander, and gross falsification has become the number one specialty of ROMANIA MARE. At these sad times, it is possible that for many readers abusing everything that is of value in our country may be a source of satisfaction. But the unrestrained perversity with which journalists of E. Barbu and Vadim Tudor's ilk persist in their vice has to do more with clinical symptoms than with culture.

One recent example of the campaign of denigration of authentic Romanian assets are the attacks directed at Vladimir Tismaneanu. That for months on end E. Barbu has been sullyng prestigious names in Romanian culture from Ana Blandiana and Mircea Dinescu to Andrei Plesu or Octavian Paler, is self-understood; that is Caliban's revenge, who even in the twelfth hour cannot control his primitive instincts. Barbu and the barbarians surrounding him have lost the game, but their blind thirst for destruction impels them to rash acts. In fact, they are perpetuating Ceausescu's practice, for whom any Romanian who had left the country was an irreconcilable enemy and independent thinking was a deathly danger. Clearly none of E. Barbu's minions (including the maestro himself) will ever, ever acquire the kind of prestige that Vladimir Tismaneanu already enjoys in the West. It is equally certain that, aside from some sinister samples of barbarism doomed by history, they will not produce anything greater than their own miserable moral character. Which does not prevent them from contaminating anything that they instinctively and instinctually hate. Because before attacking an individual, the Barbu group attacks a principle. In the present case, they are attacking the principle of integration of Romanian values in the world.

In order to ensure that evrything is as plausible as possible, everything is handled like a Securitate file. Base insinuation is combined with ordinary information. What does it matter that the reality is exactly the opposite? What does it matter that inadvertently the biography of the father of a famous Balkan prime minister is presented as the biography of a renowned professor at the University of Maryland? What does it matter that Valdimir Tismaneanu does not by choice commute between Washington and Bucharest (via Budapest, isn't it?) but between the great universities of the world? Who is going to be impressed by the fact that Vladimir Tismaneanu's doctoral dissertation dealt with the Frankfurt School, and not with the leftist aberrations that self-important Romanians fanatically adore? Who cares that Professor Tismaneanu's works are published by the most reputable publishers in the world, not by obscure printing shops? For the professional denouncer those are mere details. What matters to him is only the

fact that he can throw together a piece of trash in which a passage from letters intercepted by General Vlad's men will fit the most vulgar insinuation. The mentality of this kind of loathsome individual violates even his own sense of preservation. His obsession with sully and a hatred pushed to the brink of madness compel him to commit the irresponsibility of making public death threats. Under the pen of a certain Micsan and with the blessing of the Barbu-Vadim duo, ROMANIA MARE's ideology combines fascist horror with the dreadful ornamentation of a Bosch painting: "As a producer of damage and a carrier of infectious disease, the commuter-rat Tismaneanu Vladimir does not realize that countermeasures can be taken against him. Volodea, the exterminator is after you!"

Does that mean that after insinuation, denunciation, insult, blackmail, slander, and informing, the infernal rabble called ROMANIA MARE is now preparing for assassination?

#### Manolescu Reviews Book on King Michael

91BA0961A Bucharest ROMANIA LITERARA  
in Romanian 25 Jul 91 p 9

[Article by Nicolae Manolescu: "Where There Is No Fear, There Is No Tyranny"]

[Text] Between 10-18 July and then between 1-15 October 1990, Mircea Ciobanu talked to Michael I of Romania in Versoix, Switzerland. The outcome of those discussions is a 336-page large-format (1/16) book recently published by the Humanitas Publishing House, one-third of which contains documents from the king's personal archive. After the revolution of December 1989 the king gave several interviews in Romania. ROMANIA LITERARA carried one of the first and the most extensive of those interviews, given to Doina Uricariu (issue No. 34 of 23 August 1990). Mircea Ciobanu's book differs from all those first of all for its size. This is no longer a regular interview, but what the French call an *entretiens*, a sort of extended, scheduled conversation touching on various aspects, primarily biographical, which also includes an expression of the political, moral, religious, or other beliefs of the interviewee. Examples of such books existed in our country before the revolution, too. Florin Mugur published two "conversations," one with Marin Preda and another with Paul Georgescu. There exist an enormous number of such books in every culture, something that attests to major reader interest. And not the least merit for the *Convorbiri cu Mihai I al Romaniei* [Conversations With Michael I of Romania] belongs to the person who asked the questions. Mircea Ciobanu needs no introduction. He is a greatly appreciated poet, novelist, and essayist, well known to (but not exclusively) the ROMANIA LITERARA readership. Over the years we commented on several of his books in this column. Among them, the original five-volume novel *Istории* [Histories] was probably the best equipped to give us an idea of the scope of the author's historical and political

knowledge, something absolutely necessary for anyone who wanted to talk to a personality of the stature of King Michael. From the beginning I must point out that Mircea Ciobanu went to Versoix well informed in every respect. He is also an intelligent person with a sound education; in other words, a genuine partner for discussion, not a hasty, superficial reporter steered exclusively by his intuition. The book has a precise construction but, while it does not allow for exaggerated digressions and sidelines from the essential, it is not at all rigid; thus, it is a combination of rigor and spontaneity, necessity and chance.

King Michael revealed himself as an exceptional interlocutor. That did not come as a surprise to some of us, but to others, intoxicated by communist propaganda about the monarchy and schooled about it from history books like Mihai Roller's, the hero of Mircea Ciobanu's book will certainly come as a revelation. At the age of 70 (of which 44 years were lived in exile), King Michael is a man of strong character capable of recalling his own life (which until 30 December 1947 coincided with that of the Romanian people) without a trace of passion. A profound but controlled sadness, a remarkable sense of dignity and honor, and a wise gentleness: These are the traits of the man for whom, as he confessed at one point, devout meditation is one of the most important disciplines for the soul. Not so much prayer, by which one asks God for something, but the capacity to turn inward whenever necessary in order to understand oneself and ask oneself questions. The man who answered Mircea Ciobanu's questions with so much serenity and tact had done so many, many times before as a spiritual exercise, answering himself, that is to say, answering the questions that he himself felt a need to ask himself.

"We cannot live without absolute moral values," King Michael said simply. That means that we are either honest or we are not. We cannot be both at the same time. "Thou shalt not kill. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods. What is there that is relative in those commandments?" he asks himself. Profoundly religious, the king knows that "Nothing is accidental in a person's life, who receives messages from everywhere"; "You must learn to read them. It's like learning a language." And he added: "Many talk of God as an abstract. I am referring to the God that reveals himself in our daily acts...." Faith gave him his inner balance and allowed him to not lose hope during the long years of exile. "I don't like extremes, they are not in my nature," he admitted with the same naturalness. He is convinced that that is also the nature of the Romanian people. "The Romanian is a rational being," he said, and that is why the "Iron Guard movement had nothing to do with the Romanian spirit, which is moderate in its beliefs and in its approach to an ideology." The Iron Guardists and the Communists cannot be forgiven because they committed crimes. And the Romanians "refrained as much as possible from shedding blood." Referring to the miners' movements in 1977, which he views as comparable to the ones in Gdansk, the king noted that although they

held Ceausescu hostage, the miners behaved in a civilized manner. "When people go as far as to shed blood, that means they no longer think of their future," was the king's memorable remark in attempting to explain the charitable gesture of the Jiu Valley miners: "His (the Romanian's—N.M.) patience has to be greatly abused before he crosses over into violence. Sometimes not even then. Anywhere else in the world, this kind of leader would not have escaped alive from the hands of the crowd." In the king's opinion, moderation and faith are the only virtues that not only bring us happiness, but keep us away from erring, from injustice, and crime. They inspire courage and guard us against falling into the power of dictatorship. "A person who has faith is not afraid. And where there is no fear, there is no tyranny," are the beautiful words with which the book ends.

That was the witness whom Mircea Ciobanu chose in order to talk about Romania, the war, communism, in other words, about the past. But also about the present and the future. The book serves as a document from more than one viewpoint. Of course, there was no escape from recalling the 1940's, when the young king probably faced the most difficult and most tragic events of his life. Several hours of conversation were devoted to that period, insufficiently known to the new generation, whose protagonists have been forgotten or, if they were mentioned, they were (and continue to be) singled out for the basest lies or calumnies. Some things have become public in the past few years, but they do not seem to have altered the current opinion. Among the most useful details were those concerning the act of 23 August 1944. The king, Maniu, Bratianu, and other leaders of the time had held secret meetings about pulling the country out of the war many months before the summer of 1944. Messages had been exchanged with the Allies. Two major signals had come to Romania from the Allies: pull out of the war quickly as a condition for the civilized world's recognition of Romania, and the need to have the Communists sit in at the negotiations table. The second condition was the more alarming. It showed even before Stalingrad that Stalin was about to win not only the war against the Germans as such, but also the ideological war against the Allies. One of the leitmotifs of the king's recollections concerns the inability of the West to correctly assess Moscow's policy and react accordingly. It is no exaggeration to claim that very early on the king was persuaded, and was later reinforced in his conviction, that for a few good decades the West played into the hands of the Communists. The king is of the opinion that the real Communists need not be sought in the former communist countries, but in West Europe, where they had many and vigorous circles of influence. The Romanian Communist Party was practically inexistent in 1943-44. The Allies' wish to involve it in the negotiations was not based on a political reality. It was a concession made to Stalin's suggestion, who was carefully preparing for the aftermath of the war. All of the Soviets' actions clearly demonstrate that from the very start they intended to create the impression that the

act of 23 August was the work of the Romanian Communists (for which purpose they exploited the Allies' naivete to perfection), and as the PCR [Romanian Communist Party] was illegal in Romania, to implicitly discredit the real rulers who allegedly were not capable of breaking the pact with Germany. The Soviets' final goal was to create an image of Romania as a defeated country. That was the only way for them to justify the presence of the Soviet armies in the country after the signing of the armistice and the ouster (by the Romanian Army!) of the Germans; and it was only the presence of those armies that guaranteed the operation of turning Romania communist under the very nose of all the allied monitoring commissions.

Evidently, the king's analysis of the 1943-47 period is flawless; it is very precise and very subtle. His almost daily contacts at the time with Vishinski, Groza, and the other Communists taught him to understand their way of behaving and thinking. While the Allies wanted "peace" and "stability" in this part of Europe, the Soviets and the Communists were striving to give the opposite impression. They were maintaining a permanent state of tension. The king realized what their main method was in their relations with him: persuasion under pressure. Every day they were coming to the Palace with alarming reports and vague threats. They were keeping up a sense of urgency. Anything, however important, had to be done overnight. Blackmail was never absent from Vishinski's or Groza's methods. Another method was to lay the guilt on the other side, who was held responsible for what might happen if he did not yield to the pressure. On 30 December 1947 the king was threatened that he would be responsible for the death of the arrested 1,000 students, whom the Communists were going to execute if he did not sign the abdication act. Every time there was some spontaneous action or demonstration in favor of the king (the one on 8 November 1945 was only one of them), the Communists would stage a counterdemonstration. They trucked men in who, armed with iron bars, would hit the demonstrators. Then, under the pretext that the order was threatened (but who was threatening it, if not the government itself?), the police would intervene and shoot into the masses. Evidently, the blame was then laid at the door of the victims and the king was accused of not allowing the social and political situation in the country to stabilize. This kind of vile scenario was repeated as often as it was necessary. The young king became aware of it from the very first moment.

The space is too short to examine all the aspects of this noteworthy book. I will dwell on only one more. The book also serves as a vehicle for pure recollection, especially in the chapters in which the king remembers scenes from his childhood and adolescence, on the same occasion drawing portraits of famous people in his entourage or whom he happened to meet. His childhood was marked particularly by the fights between Carol II and Queen Elena, who was forced to leave the country in 1932. Soon thereafter Michael had to become accustomed to the presence of Magda Lupescu. Both Carol



and Magda Lupescu are treated to very penetrating portraits. Generally, a scene is first recounted, followed by a brief analysis. The character portrait style is, we would say, the classical Latin style, which excels by its briefness. Magda Lupescu "communicated a kind of unease around her, something evil." "It was enough for her to come through the door for the atmosphere to become chilled because of her." She dressed and talked shrilly. She aroused embarrassment like others arouse compassion. Carol II was "a man of his times" and "to a great extent he was the man of his own drives and passions." The Palace Marshal, Urdareanu, was another personage deeply implanted in King Michael's memory. "Urdareanu was not a man to establish relations with," he says equally concisely, "but he had managed to make having relations with him obligatory." Everyone despised him, but everyone had to reckon with him. "He was a man without scruples, slippery.... His was a dark nature." And to better illustrate it, we are told a short anecdote: "In the evening we sometimes went to Peles. It had a theater where we could see movies. One evening we came out from the movie and got into the car to go to Foisor. I was driving. Magda Lupescu sat to my right and my father was in the back seat. Before starting the engine Urdareanu came up to the car to say good evening and through the lowered window he dropped a small parcel in Magda Lupescu's lap. She opened it; inside was a green gem.... Yes, it was an emerald of impressive size. 'What's this?' she asked Urdareanu, and he replied: '*Pour vous* [For you].'" Antonescu's portrait is done in harsh colors. Although he did not like him, the king is objective about the statesman: "Antonescu was a dictator. But he was not like the other European dictators, like Hitler or Mussolini, who instigated to crime and were at best dangerous. He would have preferred to resemble the dictators of ancient Rome: sober, severe, a rescuer of virtues, and enemy of waste and frivolity." Antonescu the soldier despised civilians. He had surrounded the king with his men, who were reporting back everything. He was suspicious and he had no respect for people's private lives. He knew that Germany was going to lose the war. The reason he did not accept the solution of pulling Romania out of the war, as the king requested, was probably that as an honorable man he did not want to go back on his word to Hitler. He lived like a soldier and died like a hero. "Whatever he may have been, Antonescu remains a great personality," the king concluded now, close to half a century after history made their fates cross.

I could cite many more examples. Mircea Ciobanu's *Conversations With King Michael I of Romania* is a very valuable document, as well as very enjoyable to read.

#### **Manolescu Analyzes Privatization Law Debate**

91BA0961C Bucharest ROMANIA LITERARA  
in Romanian 25 Jul 91 p 2

[Article by N.M.: "The Political Stake of an Economic Dispute"]

[Text] The draft privatization bill has managed to divide the Parliament far more than all the previous legislative

drafts, including those on national security or the organization of the SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service]. Last week's events in the two houses were not without significance. Why has this bill become decisive for both the configuration and the political unity of the Parliament? This is a difficult question, not without pitfalls. Before attempting to answer it, I want to point out the harsh note that has crept in the tone of the various spokesmen, both of the government (see Mr. Petre Roman's televised address on Sunday evening) and of the parties: Antipopular, antidemocratic, and antinational were the most frequently voiced descriptions of the bill in question. Moreover, they were spoken in a genuine chorus not heard since the May 1990 elections. This chorus also presented another interesting trait, namely its composition. For the first time, representatives of the PNT-cd [National Peasant Christian Democratic Party], the PNL [National Liberal Party], the PER [Romanian Ecology Party], the FSN [National Salvation Front]-20 May, the PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party], and the PSDR [Romanian Socialist Democratic Party] united their voices on a major issue. And that while the UDMR [Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania] and part of the MER [Ecology Movement of Romania] stayed with the majority party to discuss the draft bill in question. The presence in the benches of the young liberals or the PDAR [Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania] did not surprise anyone. This redeployment of political forces in the Romanian Parliament is all the more worthy of attention as it occurred a few days only after the signing of an agreement between the FSN and smaller parties. Among the signatories, the PNL-Young Wing and PDAR are with the FSN on the privatization law, while MER once again revealed its hesitation. Several MER deputies left the hall, others did not. And we must not forget that initially the MER belonged to the Convention for Democracy, from which it withdrew, and now we see it interested in the Charter proposed by Mr. Roman, and that some of its local organizations did not seem enthusiastic about this realignment and voiced their disagreement. We do not know yet whether the disagreement should be interpreted as a schism, but the MER stands a good chance of falling apart if it continues to waver in this dangerous fashion. On the other hand, Mr. Weber's Ecology Party is much more firm, although the reasons presented by its chairman for rejecting the privatization bill, too, faithfully echoed those contained in the joint communique issued by the 10 parties for us to be able to guess the PER's exact position on the bill in question. And thus I come to the second important aspect of the recent events in Parliament. By definition, the joint communique only served to conceal the distinct motives of each of the 10 parties to not want to discuss the privatization bill in its current form or contents. In most cases I do not have the vaguest idea of the specific reasons for the refusal. The situation was not much clearer even when a given party did talk publicly about a privatization program: For

example, the PNT-cd, which has its own program completely different from the government's, left the parliamentary debate, while the UDMR did not, although it also has such a program, also very different from that scheduled to be examined. Not to mention that although some withdrew and others did not, many parties have yet to announce their intentions concerning the privatization. And we are not even certain that a infallible plan exists at all. In these conditions, why is the privatization bill causing more division than any other previous one?

No doubt the first answer worth considering is that this is one of the most important laws sent up to Parliament for approval since its election. On the path to a market economy if there is no privatization there is nothing. It is probable that both the parties and each deputy and senator individually are aware of the enormous consequences of this vote. A bad organization of the SRI, for example, can be set to right by a new bill, even if democracy is damaged in the meantime. But a bad privatization law can have immediate and profound consequences against which no subsequent amendment could do anything. The privatization bill is the foundation for the new economy and implicitly for the new Romanian society. An infinitesimal game of percentage points in which the supporters of various plans engaged with some carelessness may turn out famously or infamously. The government explained the delay in sending the draft to Parliament as an expression of the wish to offer the legislative forum the fruit of thorough economic thinking and extensive consultations. The prime minister talked of foreign experts. Some of them we had an opportunity to see on television. We were told that a framework was created in which every party was able to bring its own plan up for discussion. Special commissions of the two houses passed all the ideas through the sieve in a bid to keep only the most valuable. With patriotic pride, Mr. Adrian Severin informed us that Western experts are of the opinion that the Romanian plan was the best among all those hammered out for East and Central Europe! The Romanian genesis of the plan was also mentioned by Mr. Petre Roman. And after all of that, we find that at the first contact with the famous draft, Parliament blew up. The government accuses the opposition of not pleading its views democratically and leaving the legislative assembly because it did not want the privatization, while the opposition accuses the government of trying to exploit the voting mechanism of the parliamentary majority in order to pass a bill that is inadequate in its contents. The question is why has it come to a conflict of such magnitude if, as has been stated and reiterated, the draft bill has been under lengthy and distinguished scrutiny, which took into account the views expressed by all the parties and even won the approval of foreign experts. Let's try to pencil in an answer. It is clear that the government now wants to push the bill through as quickly as possible, seemingly regretting the time wasted. Its reason is undoubtedly political. It would not be the first time that the executive power allows itself to be impelled by political, rather than economic or administrative drives; a privatization

bill is a valuable electoral capital, and we must not forget that the elections are around the corner. The FSN seems to have already accepted the idea that holding elections this fall may be to the advantage of the government party. And in the electoral program hammered out by the FSN leadership the privatization bill features as a major factor. This explains the demagoguery of Mr. Severin and company. The demagoguery is designed to disguise the need to quickly pass a draft bill apt to increase the FSN's political and electoral chances. As for the opposition, it wants to turn such an important bill to its own advantage. Not to mention what an easy target would be offered by an FSN coming into the elections without the privatization bill. The core of the dissension in Parliament is not economic, but political.

In fact, for a while we have been seeing the political temperature climb. All these alignments and realignments are not accidental. Fellow travelers are being sought. Alliances are restored. This stir began at the moment the government announced that early elections were possible. Even if the president and Parliament did not seem to approve of the idea, the alarm, once it was triggered, continued to peal in every ear. A new promised reshuffle of the government, which would coopt ministers of the parties that recently signed the Roman Charter, also elicited certain positioning. In my opinion, this Charter was a tactical error: The FSN did nothing but publicly announce its perennial "secret" allies—the PNL-Young Wing and the PDAR—without securing any other real gain (because the MER's presence in that formula indicates nothing but a petty act of opportunism); moreover, the FSN thus revealed its inability to put together serious political alliances. The positioning occurred precisely among the participants in the coalition, not all of whom are convinced of its usefulness. In the bigger political picture, the deal had no major reverberations, unless it was a derisory one, which some observers interpreted as fear of the appearance of the Civic Alliance Party in the political arena. Another indication that the political movement is alive in the depths is the increasing hostility of the PUNR toward the FSN. Never before have PUNR statements been more clearly unfavorable to the government party. And that precisely at a time when the rumor is being confirmed that some of the FSN leaders are secretly meeting with the PSM [Socialist Labor Party]. Along with the PUNR, the Socialist-Democrats also left the Parliament debates, while Mr. Secares was calling on Mr. Verdet! The confusion is getting to be too much, but a few things can be glimpsed. For example, it is becoming clear that the FSN lacks unity and that the government party may splinter into several distinct groups. It seems that Mr. Secares did not have the approval of the Steering Committee for his gesture, and there is no doubt that Mr. Roman did not seek the support of the PSM or the Socialist-Democrats for his Charter. An orientation break? Equally significant is the fact that Mr. Secares' visit and the signing of the Charter by Mr. Roman happened at the same time. And then, to back up a bit, wasn't the categorical tone of the PUNR representative

in rejecting the idea of any alliance between his party and other parties intended to signal to any FSN nationalist sympathizers, who were advised not to miss one of the last trains to remove themselves from both Mr. Secares' "leftists" and Mr. Roman's "liberals," thereby drawing closer to the PUNR conservatism? The PUNR representative seemed to tell them: We are not willing to ally ourselves to an FSN torn between communist leftism and antinational liberalism, but those among you who do

not like either of those orientations still have a chance to join us! That is why I believe that the parliamentary stir created around the privatization bill has a deep political underpinning and that in the occurrence, the economic differences of views played only a superficial role, something that permitted both unnatural and spectacular realignments, held together not so much by a manifest economic doctrine as by ulterior motives of preelectoral opportunism.

**Leader of Serbian National Renewal Interviewed**

91BA0949A Nova Pazova OTADZBINA  
in Serbo-Croatian 21 Jun 91 p 6

[Interview with Mirko Jovic, president of Serbian National Renewal, by Miladin Vukosavljevic; place and date not given: "For the Unification and Spiritual Renewal of Serbia"—first paragraph is OTADZBINA introduction]

[Text] We anticipated that this time would come; if Serbia had a king, it would gain a great deal of international standing as well; Vuk Draskovic's problem is that it was hard for him to bear his defeat in the December elections; Milosevic serves Serbian national interests

The leader of the Serbian National Renewal [SNO] party, Mirko Jovic, who at numerous meetings during these June days is emphasizing that the time has come for a national struggle for Serbdom, and not a "comfortable period" for partisanship, visited Cacak on Saturday. He participated in representing the party he heads and which is, among other things, an opponent of civil war, but also of the peace in which Serbs have not slept peacefully for the past five decades, and a party whose program already contains 750 specific projects for "small factories" and which is also preparing to form a "shadow government."

[Vukosavljevic] Who are you, actually, Mr. Jovic?

[Jovic] I have lived in Nova Pazova my whole life; I was born in 1959; I am married; I have a wife and three children (a daughter and two sons). For six years now I have owned a private shop. Previously, for five years I was a train dispatcher on the railroad. Otherwise, I graduated from a traditional secondary school, and then a higher coaching school, in the basketball department; I played basketball actively for 17 years, and then I coached younger categories of basketball players for 11 years. I entered this national, not political struggle in 1988, at the time when the struggle to annex Kosovo-Metohija and Vojvodina to Mother Serbia began. We founded the first Sava association, actually a Serbian cultural club, which dealt with studying language, writing, and customs, and visited many Serbian regions and awoke Serbian national awareness. At the time when political parties began to be founded in Serbia, our club grew into the SNO, into a movement for the liberation and unification of Serbdom, and for the establishment of a Serbian kingdom.

[Vukosavljevic] In emphasizing that this is a time for a national struggle for Serbdom, and not for partisanship, you have often criticized both the government and the opposition. What motivated you to do this?

[Jovic] Above all, I think, good foresight, because we had an extraordinary premonition that a time like the one we are in now would come. We also knew that it was not good to resort to any sort of party or ideological divisions in awaiting this time when all Serbs must be together, if

they want to solve all their own problems and not be in servitude to this AVNOJ [Antifascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia], communist Yugoslavia.

[Vukosavljevic] Your party is accused of being aggressive and militant. How do you answer all those accusations?

[Jovic] Our party cannot be accused of being militant. Perhaps during this period we have only seen a little better than some others that the war against the Serbs did not end in 1941, that all those who came to the territory of Serbian lands as occupiers have remained there to the present day, and then that the Serbs, in that false communist peace, lost more than in any war to date. The best proof of this is the fact that a peace conference has never been held for that Yugoslavia, that it is not known who owes what to whom for damages caused during the war, and that those who were defeated in World War II gained from those who were supposedly the victors in it. We are seizing this moment and we are helping the Serbian people in the western regions who are crying for help. We do not feel that we are militant at all; we only want to continue honorably the work that was done before us by all our forefathers, who never reconciled themselves to the servitude of their own people.

[Vukosavljevic] It is known that as the president of a national and monarchist party you are advocating that Serbia have a king. What would Serbia gain by this?

[Jovic] Above all, it would gain a great deal of international standing; the whole world would believe that something serious has happened here. It means that we would not be criticized for having Bolshevism in Serbia in different clothing. I do not think that the Serbian authorities are Bolshevik; perhaps there are some remnants of it in Serbia in opstina administrations, but a state that has a multiparty assembly, that has a strong opposition in parliament and outside of it, in which there is a free press, in which the right to political association exists, cannot be Bolshevik....

[Vukosavljevic] We have learned that one of the most important items in your program is small business. Can you say something more to us about that part of your program?

[Jovic] Industrialization in Serbia was carried out by force, in order to prove that it was a workers' state, even though it had never had a predisposition for that. I support a modern service industry, however. Serbia has the necessary conditions for that, thanks, for example, to the large number of tourist facilities. Such chances cannot be taken advantage of without private businessmen who exist today, for example, in the area of the Stara Pazova and Indjija opstinas, and who change the entire production cycle in their private shops every three years and reorient themselves very quickly from one type of production to another.

[Vukosavljevic] We have heard that you will ask the National Assembly to put a moratorium on implementing the General Urban Development Plan for Serbia and the City of Belgrade. Why will you do that?

[Jovic] That plan was prepared at a time when Serbia was downtrodden, and when Serbia and Belgrade were ruled by anti-Serbian circles, traitors to Serbdom, who have already been replaced. We therefore should not implement it; we should prepare a new one. First, however, we have to prevent any destruction whatsoever of the legacy left to us by our czars and kings, our dynasties. So far everything that they erected has been destroyed; Serbian land registration records have been destroyed, and thus also the proof that Belgrade was Serbian more than a thousand years ago. We want to prevent that, because we are a sincere national party.

[Vukosavljevic] Your party is preparing to enter a bitter political struggle in the opstina elections. What will be your goal in doing so?

[Jovic] Because we do not believe that those elections will be held before the federal ones, we are not exactly preparing for them. I think that first elections will be held at the level of the present or some sort of "abbreviated" Yugoslavia, or even at the level of a united Serbian state, which we would like most of all. As the situation is now, I think that elections can only take place at the level of all of Serbdom; through such elections, Serbs in Serbia and from other parts of Yugoslavia will create a Serbian assembly—because what kind of Serbian National Assembly do we have now, when Dr. Milan Babic, and Dr. Radovan Karadzic, and Dr. Novak Kilibarda are not sitting in it?

[Vukosavljevic] You are constantly appealing for an end to partisan and all other divisions among Serbs. How could that be achieved, in your opinion?

[Jovic] Very simply. All those who are at the head of the state would have to realize that this is a time in which there is a great deal of danger to Serbs, and that some sort of provisional government or war headquarters should be formed in which all parties active on Serbian territory would be included. I think that this would also avoid a division that is fatal to our people, because at this time, if we are only involved in these narrow party politics, we will forget that basic interest and not offer assistance to our brethren in our threatened territories....

[Vukosavljevic] Your party has not yet joined the United Serbian Opposition. Does it intend to do so?

[Jovic] We think that it is not necessary for either an opposition or a position [as published] to exist, because all Serbs should unite regardless of their ideological orientation. Consequently, at this time both opposition and position should be abolished. The interest of the fatherland must now be above all party and personal interests.

[Vukosavljevic] How do you view everything that is currently happening in Yugoslavia, for which Serbia is more and more often being blamed for everything?

[Jovic] The intentions of all those who are accusing us are very clear. They want to establish a puppet government here, on the territory of all of Yugoslavia; the extent to which this is cynical on their part can also be seen from the fact that they are accusing the Serbs of Bolshevism, while on the other hand they are supporting the Communist Ante Markovic who has carried out two coups d'etat in the country without any vote; they are supporting him a priori, and offering him assistance just because he would betray any interest and leave all of our state's resources at the disposal of foreigners.

[Vukosavljevic] Serbia is surrounded by hatred, and peace seems more painful to the Serbian people than war. How can we get out of that encirclement?

[Jovic] Only by Serbs joining ranks. But first of all we have to forget all of the divisions within our fatherland and make it possible for all of our brethren abroad to come here, because they were banished as political dissidents; and we have to make possible the unification of the Serbian church, which has already been almost completed. Serbian returnees, who will come to us with great love for Serbia and national and human pride, should be allowed to bring their great wealth here that was acquired abroad, but also their great knowledge....

[Vukosavljevic] Have you met with Milosevic? What do you think of him?

[Jovic] I have not yet had an opportunity to meet with Slobodan Milosevic, but during previous years our interests frequently coincided, as a result of which it was often said that we were in his service. I think that it is the other way around, however, and that Milosevic is in our service. I do not mean in the service of the SNO, but rather of Serbian national interests. Let me remind you that since 1987 we have continually been trying to win people over for these national interests, and trying to persuade them that it is only through Serbian national renewal that one can count on the salvation of our fatherland, Serbia. Milosevic and the people around him, after a considerable delay, have mostly accepted what we were advocating a whole year before.

[Vukosavljevic] Vuk Draskovic is threatening new protest rallies again. What do you think about the leader of the SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement], and how do you view this threat of his?

[Jovic] Everyone has the right to work outside of parliament, and thus Vuk Draskovic does as well. We, however, are worried about the possibility of conflicts within the Serbian people, the kind that were barely avoided on 9 March. It is unnecessary to threaten protests like that one. If one wants to point out some irregularities in the symbols of the Serbian state by means of a peaceful protest, then we support that. But if the aim is a Serbian-Serbian conflict, then we will strongly condemn



it. Otherwise, I think that Vuk Draskovic's big problem is that it was very hard for him to bear his defeat in the December elections, and therefore, afterwards, he has been blundering from mistake to mistake; furthermore, he is also too personal. He has to return to the national path, and it is good that the parties that obviously do not want the good of either Serbia or the Serbian people (the Reform Forces, the Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative, the Democratic Forum, and the Peasant Party) left the alliance that he headed.

[Vukosavljevic] You recently stated in a television interview that the "Communist bastards are protecting communist Yugoslavia." What did you actually mean by that?

[Jovic] When communism died, the Communists very adroitly invented the slogan "communism even after communism." To tell the truth, Communists are still ruling in Yugoslavia today. Even though those free elections were held in the republics, Yugoslavia is still headed by someone that no one has ever voted for (or elected). I think that Ante Markovic is a direct communist successor, as well as Tudjman, Alija Izetbegovic, and Gligorov. I said "Communist bastards" because these are people who are now acting like some sort of tribal witch doctors at the head of our nonexistent peoples and states. If not for the Communists, the Macedonians and Muslims would not exist as autonomous peoples, nor would their little states that they are now representing....

[Vukosavljevic] Finally, say something else about the unification of all Serbs and the future of such a Serbia.

[Jovic] It is very clear that we want an independent Serbian kingdom within the borders that have already been established in the west. If the Serbian crown returns to the Serbian throne, that will not only fulfill divine justice, but also national justice; the Serbian martyrdom from Karadjordjevic to date will be ended, and the Serbian people will occupy the position that belongs to them by all rights and will renew their traditions, both with respect to statehood and with respect to religion and customs. I think that this will ensure Serbia's welfare—welfare not only in materialism (against which we, as a movement, are fighting, because we believe that there is no reason for us to compete over whether we will fly better airplanes and drive better cars than others, or whether we will go on vacation for a month or not), but also in the recovery of our spirituality. We will also try to have these mountains filled with Serbian children, so that there will not be so much emptiness in Serbian fields....

#### **Demographer on Resolving Croatia's Ethnic Problem**

91BA0973A Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian  
26 Jul 91 pp 10-11

[Article by Mladen Klemencic, demographer: "Yield to the Serbs, at Least in Small Sections?"]

[Text] Serbian expansionist designs on Croatian territory are usually "justified" by the existence of Serbian regions

in Croatia. The advocates of such arguments, however, have failed even today to explain on the basis of what criteria those are Serbian regions.

Because we cannot expect any change in the aggressive behavior and methods on the Serbian side, it is up to us to try on our own to establish the historical and political truth about Serbian regions in Croatia, and also to establish exactly what Croatia must do with those parts of its territory.

In the search for an answer, Serbia, as a state, has nothing to expect. The issue of the Serbs in Croatia is a matter of the diaspora of that nationality encompassed by the borders of another state, that is, it is an issue like a host of others in Europe. Serbia's important concern in this connection is certainly not the diaspora of the parent nationality, but the intention to expand its territory as a state by forceful means. Serbia would therefore make the greatest contribution to resolving the issue of the Serbs in Croatia if it were to resolve in a civilized way the numerous issues of its own minorities (Albanians, Hungarians, Muslims, Croats...).

The emergence of the Serbs in Croatia, viewed historically, has very little to do with Serbia. The Serbs in Croatia, that is, are not the residue of Croatian conquests of what were once parts of Serbia, nor is there any similar connection to the territory of the Serbian state. Right up until 1918, Serbia and Croatia had never been in the same state or alliance of states. The histories of those two countries are separate. Those two states have never warred against one another either. Croatia and Serbian history come into somewhat closer relevance only in Herceg-Bosnia, but even that is more an interweaving of the Croat and Serb peoples, and not so much a conflict between two states.

We should also say that the people and the state are not the same thing. The territory which they occupy may more or less overlap, but it is rare for them to coincide completely. It is only in the American vision that the people and the state can be equated, but that is on different premises, and that is not valid in Europe.

Serbia cannot derive its "right" to Croatian territory from history, especially because when Croatia entered the Yugoslav state it did not have a single foot of territory contributed to it by any other historical country, least of all Serbia. However, the same cannot be said of Serbia.

When the Serbs settled parts of Croatia in large numbers in the 17th and 18th centuries, Serbia did not even exist on a land map of Europe. It was part of the Ottoman Empire, against which Croatia was the "forward wall" to which it "owes" its present sickle shape.

### The Krajina as an Illusion

The Serbs who crossed the Turkish border and settled Vojna Krajina [Military Region] in Croatia did not come at that time as an ethnic group, but as a mobile population skilled in the arts of war and attracted by offers of an economic nature. Together with the Croats they shed blood in the cruel warfare on the border, and later on behalf of the monarchy to which they both belonged and whose supremacy they recognized. They also waged war in other theaters all over the old continent. That is the way it was until the end of World War I, in which the Serbs from Krajina, under the banner of the Holy Roman Emperor Franz Jozef of Austria, even waged war against the Serbs themselves, which has its own tragic dimension, but does not have much to do with Croatia.

The historical sources usually refer to the ancestors of the present Serbs in Croatia as Wallachians. However, because they belonged to the Orthodox faith, in the 19th century they inclined to Serbianism as present-day ethnic consciousness evolved. That was their right, and no reasonable man today withholds it from them. The wheel of history turns in only one direction, so that any doubt concerning some different origin of the Serbs in Croatia is pointless.

The Vojna Krajina, then, is that part of Croatia where we should look for the "Serbian" territory. One of the numerous illusions of Serbian expansionism is involved here. In the mythomania of Serbian expansionism, the entire Vojna Krajina is Serbian land. By historical law. The Krajina had no connection whatsoever to Serbia as a state, and even the ethnic facts do not support the Serbian expansionists. In the mid-19th century, the Serbs represented about 40 percent in the Slavonian Krajina of Croatia, and Croats about 60 percent. Of the 10 districts under regimental command, Serbs, i.e., Orthodox (that is how they were registered), constituted a majority in only three: in Lika and in the first and second Banija districts (present-day Banija). At the same time, Serbs represented 9.8 percent of the civilian part of Croatia and 18.6 percent in Dalmatia. So, even then there were no pure Serbian regions! There were, just as there are today, only certain sections with a more pronounced Serbian majority.

At that time, the Serbs in Krajina, together with the Croats, were in favor of its demilitarization and complete unification with Croatia. Serbia as a state was not yet involved at that time, which is another confirmation that the Croatian Serbs were and have remained a domestic issue of the state of Croatia. The problems arise with the union to form a joint state, as this act was conceived by the Croatian side, that is, or with the "annexation of the regions from the other side," as it was interpreted by Serbia. The "disagreement" is obvious, resulting in a conflict that has been cyclically renewed to this day, always accompanied by the same assertions. History, however, is completely clear, and Serbia cannot use it to justify its territorial claims.

### What Does It Mean To Say "Ethnicum Serbs"?

There remains, then, the ethnic principle to examine it as it is used in, for, or against assertions about "Serbian" regions in Croatia. It comes down to 12 percent of the population of Croatia being of non-Croat origin and demanding the right for separateness, a right to which they are entitled, and they should be granted it. This should be done even on behalf of the Croats, who, incidentally, have a century-old tradition of living together with other nationalities (Hungarians, Germans, Italians, and so on) and who, thanks to this experience, also recall periods when their own ethnic rights were denied them, so that now, when they are finally in a position to be "masters of their own house," they must not deny that same right to their fellow citizens.

As for territory, the Serbs in Croatia have to be examined in two main groups. The first are the members of the Serbian nationality who live in a compact area where their ancestors settled several generations ago, certainly before establishment of the Kingdom of Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia, and who therefore have a continuous presence in that area, where they constitute a majority or a substantial minority. These are the Serbs to whom the geopolitician Radovan Pavic has given the term "ethnium Serbs," in which ethnium signifies a people's historical, numerical, and emotional ties to a particular territory.

The second group consists of Serbs who are scattered over the remainder of Croatian territory, where they fetched up as a consequence of economic migrations and where they cannot count on "Serbian" regions being created on the basis of their nationality.

### Four Categories of Opstinas

The essential thing to definition of the ethnic Serbian regions is the population distribution, i.e., the ethnic compactness and density, all of this, of course, assuming the relevant absolute number. The Serbs in Croatia do not live in a compact community, but are fairly scattered (which is obvious from the map which we have provided) [not reproduced here]. They are present, then, in all opstinas, which means that they are largely intermixed with the rest of the population, mostly with Croats.

In most of the opstinas, Serbs constitute small fractions of the total population. Opstinas with a sizable share of Serbs, above 10 percent, are divided into four categories on the map. Most of them fall in the category in which the share of Serbs is between 10 and 20 percent, and then between 20 and 50 percent, which means that most of the population of those opstinas is non-Serb, and accordingly the Serbs cannot seek majority rights, because they are a minority.

Following that same logic, the opstinas or districts in question cannot be referred to as exclusively Serbian. Whether some of them might be Serbian is another matter, but we will be coming back to that.

However, there are parts of Croatia in which the Serbs, counted within the limits of the existing opstinas, constitute a majority. All such districts are located in the territory of the districts that once served for defense. Every citizen of Croatia knows quite well which opstinas they are. But even those opstinas are not inhabited only by Serbs. In some of them, they constitute only slightly more than half of the population (Benkovac 53 percent, Kostajnica 55.5 percent, Glina 56.7 percent, Obrovac 60.1 percent). The rest of the population there constitutes only slightly less than half, so that although these districts cannot be denied the epithet Serb, even here there is no question about exclusively Serbian districts. Even in this case these are ethnically mixed Serb-Croat communities. We can add to that group the opstinas Titova Korenica (69.2 percent), Vrginmost (71.4 percent), and Gracac (72.3 percent), in which, although there is quite a marked Serbian advantage, the non-Serb population, again mostly Croat, represents 25-30 percent.

Only opstinas with a Serb predominance of 75 percent or more, and these are Knin (78.9 percent), Dvor (80.9 percent), Vojnic (88.6 percent), and Donji Lapac (91.1 percent), in view of the high percentage, bear the epithet Serbian, although even in them there are settlements in which the population is mostly or exclusively Croat. Aside from that, those opstinas are not contiguous; that is, they do not constitute a compact territory, so that if any separate rights were to be exercised solely in them, arising out of the majority representation of a nationality which is not the parent nationality in Croatia, this would not be practical and could not be satisfactory even to that nationality, which in this case is Serbian. The present opstinas, accordingly, are not a suitable framework either for precise definition of the concept of Serbian districts or as mechanisms for the separate ethnic rights that would arise from that.

In every opstina in which the Serbs constitute a majority, however, it is possible to identify areas which for all practical purposes have an exclusively Serb population and in which the share of others is really quite small, and also those territories or at least settlements which have Croat features. The level of spatial examination, then, needs to be lowered below the level of the present opstina.

At this level, we see that there are quite small Serbian territories that exist even outside the opstinas in which Serbs constitute a majority of the population, while at the same time it is possible to single out the Croat regions and population in opstinas where the Serbs constitute more than three-fourths of the population (for example: the string of Croat settlements Zamlaca, Struga, Uncani, Golubovac, Divusa, Kozibrod, and Kuljani in the present Dvor Opstina). Where does this get us, and what should be done with the small spatial units? The answer to that question lies in the comparison to the frequently emphasized model for exercise of Swedish minority rights in Finland.

### **An Arrangement According to the Finnish Formula**

Here are the premises on which that is based and the principles of which it consists. The Swedes in Finland represent 6.2 percent of the population (in 1982, there were 300,150 Swedes in a population of 4,841,481). The opstina is the framework for exercise of separate ethnic rights, above all those defined as bilingualism.

The administrative division of Finland is into 461 opstinas, which means that in an ideal distribution each opstina would have a population of 10,500, which, of course, cannot be done in reality. Those opstinas in which the minority nationality constitutes at least 8 percent or in which the absolute number of members of that nationality is greater than 3,000 are considered bilingual. Opstinas which do not meet those conditions are considered monolingual, i.e., monoethnic.

Application of those criteria has established 396 monolingual Finnish opstinas, 24 monolingual Swedish opstinas, 21 bilingual with a Finnish majority, and 20 bilingual with a Swedish majority. An opstina's designation is always an open category, which means that it may change its status subsequently if it fulfills one of the conditions. At the same time, the bilingual status may also be lost, specifically if the relevant share of the minority nationality falls below 6 percent or below the threshold of 3,000 members.

The Finnish model was established by the 1917 Constitution. Later, it was, of course, refined, and it proved to be very successful. The history of Swedish-Finnish relations, contrary to our superficial knowledge, has nevertheless not been free of numerous and sizable conflicts.

The fundamental feature of the Finnish model is the highest possible degree of consideration for the minorities, that is, the avoidance of majority rule. The threshold for attainment of bilingual status is extremely low, and it obviously favors the minority population categories.

### **How Many Parishes Should There Be?**

If we compare the Finnish model to the Croatian situation, there are two essential differences. First, the Serbs in Croatia have twice as high a relative proportion of the population, which means that there must be a corresponding adjustment of the numerical thresholds for establishment of bilingualism. Second, the number of opstinas in Croatia is one-fourth of the number of opstinas in Finland, although the size of the population is the same. The second difference is the bigger problem, but it is not insoluble. In dealing with such a subtle thing as interethnic relations, smaller spatial units are a much better framework for solving the problem, because it is easier to take into account the existence of proportionally small concentrations of the majority population.

Copying the model for Croatian conditions means atomization of the territorial units in Croatia, making them smaller. That is why we need to arrive at a reasonable

definition in order to establish biethnic or monoethnic Croat and Serb opstinas and the content in the economic, political, and cultural sphere where the Serbian nationality in Croatia, but also every other non-Croat nationality (Czech, Italian, and Hungarian) desires to exercise special rights. Whether this is to be called cultural, political, or some other autonomy or home rule, that is a matter to be agreed on. It is the content that is essential, and this must be democratically established and sanctioned by law.

In Croatia, this would bring about a "matrix" model of minority rights, which, according to the same criteria, would function both for Serbs and for Croats. Instead of limiting ourselves to 11 or fewer opstinas with a Serb majority, it can be applied even outside those opstinas, and at the same time it guarantees the rights of Croats in regions where they are a minority in Serbian communities.

The institution of monoethnic and biethnic, and perhaps even triethnic, opstinas can be tied in to the new administrative division of Croatia into parishes, which was announced toward the end of last year. It is assumed, that is, that the territory of Croatia might consist of between 12 and 15 parishes, which actually would be the hinterland areas of the same number of the largest urban and economic centers in Croatia. (The present author has submitted certain proposals along those lines in GLOBUS back in December 1990.)

The parishes, then, would be a reflection of the main lines of economic force in Croatia and would, then, be in a way economic regions, and the opstinas, which are supposed to number at least between fourfold and fivefold more than today, would reflect the historical and cultural legacy of Croatia, with appreciation for its local multinational composition.

#### When Would the Epithet "Serbian" Be Applied?

The territory of Croatia of which it has been provisionally said that it might bear the epithet Serbian, even if it were to include all those opstinas with a Serb majority, could not be brought together into a single parish without betraying all logic. Particularly when the criterion of gravitational orientation is applied, those "Serbian" regions would have to be distributed among several parishes. They would, then, be split up into pieces, which would make it more difficult to exercise special ethnic rights at the parish level. The criterion of those regions has even up to now been economic gravitation toward centers which are outside them, because none of the centers in those regions, of which the largest is Knin, has any very significant economic or demographic potential.

One of the questions that should be answered is the threshold of biethnicism. In Finland, where Swedes represent 6.3 percent, that threshold is 8 percent. In Croatia, where the Serbs constitute 12 percent, and other non-Croats represent an additional 10 percent, the threshold might range between 10 and 15 percent. All

opstinas with a share of Serbs above that threshold would be biethnic, Croat-Serb or Serb-Croat, depending on the proportion, and, if necessary, triethnic opstinas might be established, for example, Croat-Serb-Czech communities.

Opstinas in which Croats represented less than 10 to 15 percent, according to the same proposal, would be exclusively Serb, and the level of autonomy or home rule in them would be higher than in the bilingual opstinas. Just because they are defined as Serb does not mean, of course, that they would become Serbian. From the standpoint of constitutional law, they would continue to be an integral part of the Croatian state; it is just that the ethnic territory of the Serbian nationality in Croatia, the territory on which that nationality would exercise the right to separateness, would be more precisely defined.

The majority nationality, the Croats, would thereby state in specific terms what up to now has been only a vaguely proclaimed offer of autonomy to the Serbs, and the Serbs in Croatia would finally have to forget banditry and accept democratic rules of the game.

In defining the content of the specific ethnic rights, the Croats must not be ungenerous, because once this or a similar system puts down roots, it would make it possible for life to function in the Croatian state.

Some readers of this proposal might perhaps ask whether all this makes sense at the height of the Serbian expansionist campaign and the universal negation of the Croatian state and persecution of Croats in the districts inhabited predominantly by the Serbs? If we really want a sovereign, but also modern Croatia, the last thing we can accede to is dropping down to the level of the rhetoric and practice of megalomaniacal Serbian policy. Whereas unfounded and unrestrained border claims, "offers" to jointly divide up the territory of a third republic, or again in human projects drawn up in offices for large resettlement of population are coming in from the other side, Croatia, if it wants to maintain a democratic reputation in the eyes of the Western world, must insist on modern and recognizable solutions, not on a stereotyped repetition of empty phrases. The question of the Serbs in Croatia is not just a question of history and the present. This is a question of Croatia's future.

#### Bosnian Leader on Muslim-Croat Relations Crisis

91BA0982A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian  
30 Jul 91 p 29

[Interview with Dr. Rusmir Mahmutcehajic, deputy prime minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Party for Democratic Action, SDA, ideologist, by Fahrudin Radoncic; place and date not given: "We Will Not Give Bosnia; Deputy Prime Minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina and SDA Ideologist Talks About Crisis in Muslim-Croat Relations"]



[Text] Rusmir Mahmutcehajic is among those who, through their comments, provide an ideological weave to the current policy of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA].

[Radoncic] It is known that there has recently been a fair amount of contact between influential figures in the SDA and in the Croatian government. Have there been any misunderstandings or conflicts during this? If so, what was the source?

[Mahmutcehajic] For a long time, it was assumed that the psychological and historical closeness between the Croats and Muslims would continue indefinitely. Almost nothing was done to translate feelings into intelligible plans for joint relations in the future. And when the national policies of these two nations appeared on the stage after the breakdown of the totalitarian utopia, several differences became evident. Changes undergone by Muslims in their political and cultural development remained invisible and incomprehensible to many of the people who were devoted to the old patterns of our relations. There appeared to be very little basis for the intellectuals and political leadership of these two nations to gain a more thorough understanding of the orientations and goals of their counterparts.

There was no coordination and, understandably, some impressions arose that the Muslims considered to be in conflict with the basic premises of their political will, and thus with the conditions for their survival in this region as well. That is the reason for the reexamination of everything that engenders such feelings. This was discussed at three official meetings between representatives of the SDA and the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community]. It is important to say that the talks finally commenced and that, as always, they represent a prerequisite to an agreement.

[Radoncic] Is it possible to say that official Zagreb does not recognize all the distinctive traits of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the history and political milieu of this region?

[Mahmutcehajic] Bosnia is chock-full of nuances that are difficult to perceive, so that it is easy to understand why it remains unintelligible and extraordinary to many. Contemporary politics yearns for simplified patterns. When one looks at the politicization of the contemporary Croatian social scene, a blindness towards Bosnian nuances is discernible. Fallacies and ignorance concerning Islam and Muslims are not rare and completely out of fashion, adopted as they are from European barracks in which soldiers and officers are trained for military campaigns "in the name of the cross, and for the sake of dollars."

[Radoncic] Lately, there is no shortage of speculation to the effect that the Muslims have decided to turn their backs on the untrustworthy Croats and pursue their interests in an agreement with the Serbs.

[Mahmutcehajic] It is quite understandable that many political smugglers will seek gains from this discussion of the premises of Muslim and Croat politics, initially out of the public eye. Muslim national policy has a certain advantage, because it is not burdened by old and obsolete patterns. In addition, it has inherited experience with openness and adaptability. As you can see, this has enabled it to lift itself up very quickly, its death sentence notwithstanding. Its basic principles, expressed both clearly and energetically, confuse our interlocutors and those involved in seeking a new South Slavic agreement. In this confusion, it is not unusual for them to resort to objectionable acts of deceit. Both Zagreb and Belgrade are looking for smugglers among the unauthorized and unrecognized representatives of the Muslim political will, only to subsequently label them "leading and respected figures" for their own benefit and intentions. But in fact they do not represent a single member of their own households. Thus, the Muslims, being brought face to face with their policy, are now being accused of a turnaround on the basis of the dubious propaganda of these same business and academic smugglers in whom they sought allies and supporters until only recently.

[Radoncic] It is known that Adil Zulfikarpasic, the leader of the MBO [Muslim Bosnian Organization], has met with Vuk Draskovic and Slobodan Milosevic. What do you think about that?

[Mahmutcehajic] I am saddened by all spectacles of this enfeebled will under the guise of historical significance. And those who called on him to play the role of destroyer of Muslim politics know that they cannot find a more suitable person. But it appears that they do not know that in this way they are demonstrating both the shallowness and the hopelessness of their own dreams. Do Zulfikarpasic and Milosevic really have anything new to say?!

[Radoncic] From your response it follows that Zulfikarpasic, regardless of interpretation, was not playing the role of some Muslim advance guard in talks with Serbian politicians?

[Mahmutcehajic] The Party of Democratic Action today enjoys the support of the majority of the Muslim nation. It has a clear position with regard to the bases for talks with Serbs and Croats. Some other political centers have a need for other bases and for their advancement, and they are hurrying off in that direction. Do you really think that the Party of Democratic Action, with such a strong basis of confidence among the Muslim nation, would allow itself this type of frivolity?!

[Radoncic] Aside from the declaration that a conflict will begin in Bosnia-Herzegovina that will "ignite Europe," are there any political-legal mechanisms that will let Muslims prevent a potential Serbian and Croatian decision on a definitive partition of B-H [Bosnia Herzegovina]?

[Mahmutcehajic] Surely those who dream of this crime have not studied their history well enough. Do they



really think that it is possible to achieve a more congruous border between Orthodoxy and Catholicism than the one that was achieved in the sumptuous archipelago of Bosnian history? Do they think that through this they will achieve a greater gain for their nations and their cultures than what the Bosnian model has offered them over the centuries?! I am convinced that more effective forces are needed in order to disturb the Bosnian balance. Seeing these forces solely in weapons is an utterly weak view. Among the current advocates of this madness, there are none who possess the common sense, skill, and tenacity to hold sway over these forces. The Bosnian personality is so steadfast that these forces cannot break it down, although I do not doubt the possibility of pain, bloody stabs, and cuts.

[Radoncic] There are theories in circulation, as well as oblique signs of acknowledgement, that it would be possible to create some sort of Islamic state as a sort of buffer zone between the Serbs and Croats. Is it possible that Muslim political leaders could accept having their people live in some sort of religious reservation?

[Mahmutcehajic] These are very malicious rumors. They are being created and spread by those who cannot accept the stated principles of current Muslim politics. These are the same people who until only yesterday proclaimed themselves the defenders of Europe against the alleged Islamic threat. These are the same people who were worried while the Muslim nation languished in humiliation endured by no other European nation. For a half a century, the Muslims were the only nation on the old continent without any cultural, religious, and political autonomy whatsoever. And what do you know: Now our "friends" are going so far as to offer this nation an "Islamic state." But in fact these magnates of artifice and machinations clumsily want to take advantage of the European prejudice towards Islam, which is already past its prime and dying out. Those offering Muslims an "Islamic state" instead of an integral, sovereign Bosnian state, are clumsily seeking the support of Europe in their enthusiasm to commit the crime of destroying the Bosnian state. This is a non-Muslim idea intended to inflict injury on the Muslims. And the advocates of this crime, as we know, are taking the road of those who have gone astray and on whom the "wrath and fury of God" has been vented.

**Historic Agreement Between Muslims, Serbs**  
*91BA0982B Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian*  
*2 Aug 91 p 3*

["Text" of agreement between the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Muslim Bosnian Organization, issued at a press conference in Sarajevo on 1 August]

[Text] Confronted with the development of events which bring with them an ever-greater danger of confrontation between our two nations, who historically have not had conflicting interests and who have never been involved

in that sort of conflict, aware of the responsibility to the nations that we represent and to all the nations of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia, we have decided, for the purpose of future cooperation and peace, to institute and sign the following political agreement:

1. Aware of the difficulties that we have inherited and of those engendered thus far by political life after the elections, we have decided in the spirit of openness and mutual respect to espouse the realization of the historic and political interests of our two nations. Moreover, this is not an agreement directed against anyone; rather, it is for everyone, and as such it will be open to everyone who supports the principle of coexistence in freedom and full equality.

2. We believe that the basis for such existence is mutual recognition of the sovereignty of individual nations and a guarantee of the full territorial integrity and political subjectivity of our Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of its selfsame constitutional-legal position with other republics in the common state of Yugoslavia.

3. In our opinion, Yugoslavia has full historical justification as a common state of fully equal republics and nations, and we will espouse the preservation and development of that type of community.

4. We agree that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be a legally-politically unified and democratically disposed federal entity, with legal say over all parts of its territory, under the condition that the federal Constitution and legislation are the basis for the legal system of the country and the guarantee for the equality of the citizens, nations, and republics.

5. We express our interest that Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina live with us in full equality and we call on them to enter into this agreement. Regardless of the position of the Republic of Croatia in or outside of Yugoslavia, Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina are a fully equal nation.

6. Mutual relations among citizens, nations, and republics in Yugoslavia will be arranged in a joint constitution, under application of European standards.

7. We are aware that this agreement scarcely represents a political and historical basis for our ongoing and peaceful coexistence. However, this type of political settlement opens up the door to finding the most constructive and rational solution in terms of the functioning of federal and/or common institutions, namely, those concerning the monetary system, the unified market, unified armed forces, and foreign affairs.

8. Similarly, we believe that the optimal Yugoslav community is one that comprises all six republics and all the nations that initially constituted this community. All departures from this community by those nations and republics that so desire presuppose the reaching of an agreement on this and the provision of guarantees for the real interests of each of the members in relations with the others.

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